

THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

DECEMBER 1955


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NOT YET TIME TO
TURN IN YOUR HAT

*The Sheep & the Goats Or Why
Penalize the Over-Specialized?*

Why Hollywood Can't
Make Soldiers

THEY MADE THE SUN
STAND STILL



NOT OVERHEARD DURING THE AUSA MEETING AT FORT BENNING

FIRST SOLDIER: What's doin' here? All these big generals around and all that gear and stuff down at Lawson Field?

SECOND SOLDIER: Aw, it's a meetin' of the Journal of the Combat Armed Forces Association of the United States Army.

FIRST SOLDIER: What's that?

SECOND SOLDIER: I'll be blowed if I know, 'cept it sure's got a name as big as the mouth of a fat catfish grabbin' a worm.

FIRST SOLDIER: Homestead around here long enough and you'll see everything. Maybe Krooshove next week and them other smilin' Reds.

SECOND SOLDIER: I ain't seen Terry Moore down here but I'm eager.

WE don't know about Mr. Khrushchev or Miss Moore, soldiers, but we do get your point about our name. You've got it a bit more tangled than most people do, but not much more. You're referring to two different things. First there is the Association of the U. S. Army. That's a good clear name, easily remembered. A good name for a good and growing outfit.


Then there is "The Army Combat Forces Journal" which is the name of the magazine the AUSA publishes. That's a pretty long name for a magazine and also a little confusing.

Some people habitually call it the "Armed Forces Journal." Once we got a letter addressed to the "Coast Guard Artillery Journal." Some get it confused with the *Army-Navy-Air Force Journal* which is a weekly service newspaper published in Washington only a couple of blocks from our shop. Our good friend LeRoy Whitman who runs it takes the confusion in good spirit, but we suspect he sometimes wishes our name was a little less like the name of his venerable—it began way back in Civil War days—and lively sheet. And we are sure a lot of people who stumble over our name wish it was shorter.

We got news for them and for you. Beginning with our February issue the magazine will be called **ARMY**—a short name that tells exactly what the magazine is. A better name for a magazine getting better all of the time.

P.S. We hope Terry does get down your way before long.

**In February your favorite magazine
will appear with a new name**



Combat Information Center aboard U.S. aircraft carrier
— plotter charts aircraft tracks on plexiglass screen for
computers on other side



ON THE JOB... not "on the way"

The marvels of radar equipment give the military "eyes in the dark" to spot enemy action.

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The ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL is a professional military magazine devoted to the dissemination of information and ideas relating to the military art and science representing the interests of the entire Army. The ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL strives to—

Advance man's knowledge of warfare in the fields of strategy, tactics, logistics, operations, administration, weapons and weapons systems.

Advance man's knowledge and understanding of the soldier as an individual, as a member of a trained unit, and as a member of the whole Army; emphasizing leadership, esprit, loyalty, and a high sense of duty.

Disseminate knowledge of military history, especially articles that have application to current problems or foster tradition and create esprit.

Explain the important and vital role of the United States Army in the Nation's defense and show that the Army is alert to the challenges of new weapons, machines, and methods.

Advance the status of the soldier's profession.

(Adopted by the Executive Council of the Association of the U. S. Army, 21 June 1954)

The ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

DECEMBER 1955

Vol. 6, No. 5

COVER

An Honest John artillery battery for the Southern European Task Force arrives at Vicenza, Italy, from West Germany (Publi-
foto from Black Star)

SPECIAL FEATURES

Not Overheard During the AUSA Meeting at

Fort Benning Cover 2

Report from Your AUSA CP 54

Secretary's Report on AUSA Business Meeting 56

ARMS AND THE MAN

Let's Make the Army the Forward Service 12

Not Yet Time to Turn in Your Hat 15

The Nature of Command Col. John M. Pitzer 19

Hollywood Can't Make Soldiers

Lt. Col. Edward M. Flanagan, Jr. 22

The Sheep and the Goats Lt. Col. Tocsin 29

The Glory and Tragedy of Bataan Major Louis Morton 34

NATO's Strategy and NATO's Troubles David Manker 52

TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

Let's All Fly on Platforms Capt. John G. Mantaras 25

Don't Give Up the Regiment Col. Carleton E. Fisher 26

The RCCCD Gets the Pix 38

They Made the Sun Stand Still Lynn Montross 40

DEPARTMENTS

The Month's Mail 4 The Month's Reading 50

Front and Center 8 The Month's Authors 59

Cerebrations 47 The Month's Books 60

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THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL



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MARTIN
BALTIMORE

THE MONTH'S MAIL

The Annual Meeting

• I do not know when, in recent years, I enjoyed such a feeling of revived spirit, such a feeling of new hope for the reestablishment of those things which used to mean so much to the Army as I felt during the meeting of the Association of the United States Army. A sense of actual solidarity and unity in a common cause—that cause being the only life I've ever known, the U. S. Army—was transmitted to us by the various speakers.

CAPT. LESLIE S. AYERS
3d Co, 1st Stu Bn, TSB
Fort Benning, Ga.

• I want to thank you very much for the many kindnesses shown to me and my people on our visit to Fort Benning for the first meeting of the United States Army Association.

From what I could observe and the reports that have come to me, the Army has taken a very positive step forward. For a first convention, I think it went very smoothly and the Association is to be congratulated for the manner in which it handled the whole show.

You know how I feel about all of this, and I hope you will feel free to call upon us whenever we can be of assistance.

R. S. BOUTELLE
President

Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp.
Hagerstown, Md.

• Just a short note to express my appreciation for the courtesies extended to me by the Association of the U. S. Army.

The program at Fort Benning was intelligently planned and expertly executed. General Weible, Colonel Cocklin and all others who contributed their time, efforts and thought to the agenda are entitled to commendation from the Department of the Army and all members of the Association.

It is my hope that this first meeting will be the forerunner of other successful annual meetings.

GEORGE W. LATIMER
Judge

U. S. Court of Military Appeals
Washington, D. C.



• I was flattered to be asked to come to Fort Benning and delighted to participate in the Seminar. I think you know how I feel about the Army; it is one of the apples of my eye and anything I can do to help it I am only too anxious to do.

HANSON W. BALDWIN
Military Editor

The New York Times
New York, N. Y.

• It was fun, and I learned a lot. I am now dedicated to practicing what I preach by telling "The Army Story."

ESTHER VAN WAGONER TUFTY
Tufty News Bureau
Washington, D. C.

• On behalf of the Reserve Officers Association of the United States, and myself particularly, I wish to express our deep appreciation for the cordial hospitality of the Association of the United States Army on the occasion of the first annual meeting at Fort Benning. It was a great honor, indeed, to be your guest.

The visit was a very memorable occasion, and one of the most worthwhile

experiences I have had. You and your committee are to be congratulated on a very splendid job of arrangements, done in the traditional Army Team efficiency and effectiveness.

COL. CARL J. KOENIG
National Vice President, Army Reserve Officers Association
Washington, D. C.

• Just a note to tell you how much I enjoyed the two days at Fort Benning and the excellent program you arranged for the first annual meeting of the Association of the United States Army.

CHESTER R. DAVIS
Assistant Secretary of the Army
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C.

• Let me congratulate you on the wonderful job of the first annual meeting of the Association of the Army. I am sympathetically cognizant of how many things can go wrong in arranging that sort of affair.

In the meantime, confirming my open suggestions at the meeting, I hope the Association will consider Fort Belvoir as a site for next year.

LT. GEN. S. D. STURGIS, JR.
Chief of Engineers
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C.

• I am sure you must realize that the initial proceedings of the Association of the Army had a big impact on all who were here....

MAJ. GEN. G. E. LYNCH
Commanding
Hq 3d Inf Div
Fort Benning, Ga.

• It was a real occasion to have an opportunity to be present and to see the magnificent job which was done this year in putting on the First Annual Meeting of the Association of the United States Army.

MAJ. GEN. LEWIS B. HERSHY
Director
National Headquarters
Selective Service
Washington, D. C.

• I would like to express my apprecia-

tion again for your kindness and courtesy in extending me the invitation to go to Benning for the meeting of the Association of the U. S. Army and for the cordial hospitality which I received everywhere. . . .

ROY DE S. HORN
Commander, USN

U. S. Naval Institute
Annapolis, Md.

• I shall be more than pleased if the Association of the United States Army or any active officer of the Army will call on me at any time I can render service. I am sure that everyone who attended the Fort Benning meeting was inspired by the contagious enthusiasm of everyone who participated.

WILLARD F. ROCKWELL
Chairman of the Board
Rockwell Spring and Axle Co.
Pittsburgh, Penna.

• Just a note to tell you that General Wood and I and the other officers were very pleased at the opportunity of seeing you at Fort Benning and of attending the Association annual meeting. The entire program was most interesting and educational and we want to express our congratulations to you for the fine program that was worked out.

I am certain that such conferences in the future will be of great benefit to our Army.

MAJ. GEN. GUY N. HENNINGER
The Adjutant General
AGO, Lincoln, Nebr.

• I am sure that you have returned from the Association of the United States Army meeting at Fort Benning with the same reaction I did, to wit: Certainly glad I went; thought it was a fine program, certainly well worth my time.

I genuinely enjoyed the opportunity to be associated with you. As I stated then, I am at your disposition if it will ever be of any help or assistance to you. I can be located through Delta Air Lines in Atlanta at any time.

ERLE COCKE, JR.
*Past National Commander,
The American Legion*
Delta C&S Air Lines
Atlanta, Ga.

• I do not want to let any more time go by without thanking you for the courtesy shown to me during my stay at Fort Benning. It was a privilege to be permitted to participate at the meeting of the Association of the United States Army.

HENRY A. KISSINGER
Council on Foreign Relations
New York, N. Y.

• Just a note to say thank you for the

DECEMBER 1955

PEAK SERVICE



Piasecki H-21 Work Horse helicopters are playing an indispensable part in building and servicing early-warning Arctic radar and communication stations.

Daily, H-21's are ferrying construction personnel and tons of equipment to remote mountain top sites. This **peak service** is providing a vital third dimension in transportation for America's first line of defense.



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MORTON, PENNSYLVANIA

ENGINEERS NEEDED: Send resume to Employment Representative

beautiful conference you ran down there at Fort Benning, and to express my pleasure at being with you again on the most interesting and worthwhile occasion. I enjoyed it greatly. I do hope it won't be too long before I have a chance to see you again.

ALLEN D. ALBERT, JR.
Civilian Aide to the Secretary
of the Army

281 W. Paces Ferry Road NE
Atlanta, Ga.

• I wish to take this opportunity to congratulate you and all the members of the Association's staff for a most stirring and instructive program and for the efficient manner in which the demonstrations and other sessions were conducted. This was indeed an historic occasion—one that should mark a new era of understanding and enthusiasm for the United States Army—and I was indeed privileged to have been there.

R. E. LEWIS
Managing Editor
American Ordnance Association
Washington, D. C.

• I am writing to let you know how much I enjoyed the procedures at Fort Benning. I thought the program was very interesting and worthwhile and I am sure

the benefits that will result over a period of time will react very favorably for the interests of the Army team. Since this is the place where the combined arms and services are all brought together tactically to form the field army team, I would have liked to have invited the Association to make Leavenworth the scene of the next meeting. Unfortunately, however, we do not have accommodations here when all our classes are in session and our Fall Associate Class does not leave until the middle of December.

MAJ. GEN. GARRISON H. DAVIDSON
Commandant

Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kans.

• The first Annual Meeting of the Association of the United States Army was an outstanding success and I, too, am proud to be a member of the Army team.

The visit to Benning was most profitable and enjoyable, and I look forward to attending the second annual meeting.

MAJ. GEN. HUGH S. MCLEOD
Commanding

Hq 76th Inf Div
West Hartford, Conn.

From a Well-Wisher

• There is enclosed my check to cover my subscription through August 1956. I

look forward to receiving my copy of The JOURNAL each month, as there are many excellent articles which afford pleasant and constructive reading. May I extend my sincere congratulations to your staff for a very excellent publication, and to wish you every success in your membership drive.

LT. COL. FLOYD W. HINES
Hq 98th AAA Bn
Belleville, N. J.

Glad to be in the Army

• I want to tell you how much I enjoyed the reprint of the text of General Taylor's address to the Association of the U. S. Army in the November issue. It was especially interesting to me now because at this particular stage of my career it is a question that is often presented me: "Why do you want to be in the Army?" I feel that General Taylor has put all the feelings I have on the subject, along with many other wonderful and stimulating ideas, in words so typical of our Chief of Staff. Unfortunately these ideas are not considered and defended as often as they might be.

CADET JAMES N. ELLIS
West Point, N. Y.

Resurrect the Bugles

• What has happened to the "Old Army" bugle calls? Their almost total absence has created a void that needs filling. A few units have created flashy drum-and-bugle corps and fancy-drill teams that are very nice and add a lot to ceremonies and special events. Some enterprising small units, like on-site AAA batteries, have installed loudspeaker systems over which basic bugle calls are played. Both these ideas have added a needed amount of zest to an otherwise bleak, dreary existence. But neither is quite satisfactory. The bugle call should be commonplace and constant, not reserved for parades, football games, and so on. And a scratchy, skipping, and sticking record is a poor substitute at best for the original.

For the most part, many present-day soldiers have only a meager knowledge of even the basic calls—and most of that knowledge is gained from the current crop of racy novels about service life.

Why not authorize bugles (and buglers) for every camp, post, station, kaserne, or what have you, by amending the T/O&E of appropriate units? Let such standard items as the first sergeant's whistle and the guidon be bolstered by bugle calls.

Having been trained in an atmosphere of bugle calls, I have come to attach a fondness and meaning to them—not pride or morale or *esprit*, exactly, but some intangible something that everyone talks about these days and never explains.

SENTIMENTAL SAM

APO 28



**DRONE
'COPTER**

Typical of the advanced research and development projects currently being carried out successfully by Kaman Aircraft is this drone helicopter. The technical problems of remote control are more complex with a helicopter than with fixed-wing aircraft because of the 'copter's ability to fly in every direction at varying speeds, as well as to hover in flight. Kaman engineers solved these complicated problems by designing an entirely new electronic control system, miniature mechanical system and small automatic pilot. Kaman is proud that most of its 10 years have been devoted to the National Defense effort to keep the free world free.

KAMAN

THE KAMAN AIRCRAFT CORP., BLOOMFIELD, CONN.





Thick, nylon flak-curtain and armor plate in rear compartment protects observer.



Flak-curtain and armor plate afford pilot maximum protection.



Three-quarter inch armor plate fits under pilot and observer seats.

Cessna's new armored OE-2 protects Marine pilots

Cessna's new reconnaissance-liaison plane—the OE-2—brings greater versatility to Marine Corps air operations, is specifically designed to give the pilot protection in combat.

The OE-2's self-sealing fuel tanks, flak-curtains and armored seat provide maximum protection during ground support operations.

The rugged new plane has a top speed of 190 m.p.h., is a more powerful version of Cessna's famed L-19. The OE-2 will be used

as an artillery spotter, target marker, to lay communications wire and to drop supplies to troop positions.

The OE-2's 220 m.p.h. dive-speed capability increases its effectiveness in target-marking operations. It is the first liaison airplane with built-in target marking facilities.

The versatile OE-2, which meets a specific need, is another example of Cessna's co-operation with the military in planning for today's air age.

CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY



WICHITA, KANSAS

FRONT AND CENTER

The Army is giving its research programs "the highest priority," Mr. Brucker said recently. And we think he meant it. He further made it clear that research doesn't necessarily mean Buck Rogers. The Army "must have many different weapons, each as perfectly adapted as possible to a particular function. There can be no such thing as a single 'best' weapon which satisfies all requirements. The most powerful guided missile is certainly no substitute for a rifle when you need a rifle." The Army, he continued, must have "an appropriate atomic weapon capability." And lots of other things too: "It must at all times possess the tools which enable it to apply the exact amount and kind of force which is appropriate to whatever task is in hand." To get the mobility and flexibility it must have today, the Army has a vital need for light aircraft of its own," Mr. Brucker said. It must have aircraft "for command, observation, artillery adjustment, and resupply; for the evacuation of the wounded, for the rapid movement of patrols, outposts and other small bodies of troops, and for similar purposes." Mr. Brucker said "it's own aircraft," let it be noted.

U. S. from Alaska. The 71st Division's designation will then become inactive. Home stations of the returning 4th, 5th and 9th Divisions are to be announced later. A non-Gyroscope change of station involves the 1st Armored Division. It will move to Fort Polk, La., on the completion of the Sagebrush maneuvers, instead of returning to Hood. III Corps headquarters, plus logistical and support units, also at Fort Hood, are scheduled to move into Fort Polk too.

While Army enlisted promotions continue to increase 100 men were promoted to master sergeant in November—a program was underway to re-train noncommissioned officers and specialists in skills in which shortages exist. Currently the Army has too many food service specialists, administrative specialists and military policemen, but needs more engineers, armor specialists, and infantry light and heavy weapons specialists. In one Army area 452 master sergeants and sergeants first class who were food service specialists were retrained for combat assignments. The Army draft call for January is 8,000 men.

The language Justice Black used in the majority opinion of the Supreme Court in the Toth decision can only be interpreted as meaning that the Court has less than full faith in military justice. How else interpret such an expression as this: "... military tribunals have not been and probably never can be constituted in such a way that they can have the same kind of qualifications that the Constitution has deemed essential to fair trials of civilians in Federal courts." That the Toth decision will have considerable effect on the operation of military courts in overseas areas is quite apparent. For example, could a soldier's dependent who committed a crime while stationed at a U. S. military installation in a foreign country be court-martialed? The answer would seem to be no, since a dependent is a civilian. Indeed, an appeal based on this point was filed a few days after the Toth decision in the case of a woman convicted by court-martial of killing her serviceman-husband in their quarters on a base in Europe. Another effect of the Toth case was that the three "turncoats" who later returned from

Gyroscope is having its troubles, largely because of cuts in manpower, but it's still whirling. The next move is the 11th Airborne Division to Germany replacing the 5th Infantry Division. The 8th Infantry Division and the 3d Armored Division will go to Germany next year, replacing the 9th and 4th Infantry divisions. The 2d Infantry Division will send two combat teams to Alaska to replace the 71st Infantry Division; the third RCT of the 2d Division will remain at Fort Lewis, Wash. Officers and men in the 4th Infantry Division will be reassigned or rotated back to the U. S. individually and the division designation will take over the 71st Infantry Division when it rotates back to the

The news in this photograph is that the Army Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories at Fort Monmouth developed the miniature magnetron tube being held by Miss Joan Conran, a Laboratories' employee. The only vital statistics we have are that the tube weighs three ounces and is 50 times more powerful than the klystron tube it replaces. The golf ball is to show its relative size. The tube is expected to be of military use in short-range communications and in mobile radar sets that can be carried by combat soldiers into the front lines.





Two veterans of the Screaming Eagle division meet at the Presidio of San Francisco. Gen. Taylor greets Donald Litwin who lost a hand and leg near Bastogne during the Battle of the Bulge. Litwin is now a civilian employee at Sixth Army headquarters.

Korea and were awaiting trial were freed because they had been dishonorably discharged when they chose to remain with Chinese Communists. Meanwhile, men who did not "turn" but did commit violations of military law while POWs are in jail. This doesn't excuse the latter of course, but the effect of the Toth case does make the administration of justice seem remarkably uneven.

Aviation Week, which usually knows what it is talking about, reports that the Air Force and not the Army is to develop a supersonic surface-to-surface missile with a range of 1,000 to 1,500 miles. However, the Army will continue with its Redstone SSM. Evaluation of tests of the Army's Corporal missile and Honest John rocket and the Air Force's Matador missile during Sagebrush could produce some

evidence as to whether "mid-range" missiles are artillery or air power.

Reorganization of the Chemical Corps is in the works since Mr. BRUCKER approved the recommendations of a civilian committee appointed by ChmC Chief, MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM M. CREASY. The reorganization will include appointment of an Assistant


This, the first photograph we received from Sagebrush PIO, after the opening of the big maneuvers, may be more significant than trite, since those with a sense of history will see it as evidence that even in an age of A-bombs soldiers (and their mascots) travel on their stomachs. Or, as someone might misquote Napoleon as having said: "Chow is to thermonukes as three [or five, or fifteen] is to one."





Retirement of an infantryman. Gen. Taylor pins the Combat Infantryman Badge on Medal of Honor soldier, Maj. Gen. William F. Dean at retirement ceremonies at the Presidio of San Francisco.

This is a model of a commercial version of the atomic-power generating station that is being built for the Army at the Engineer School, Fort Belvoir, Va. Shown within the vapor container are the nuclear reactor, primary pumps and steam generator. Three water tanks are in the right foreground while the feed-water and evaporator, essential to the plant's closed cycle, pressurized-water system, are in the right background. This model was built by Alco Products Co., which is also building the Army's APPR at Fort Belvoir.



Chief Chemical Officer in charge of long range planning and doctrine, and establishment of three commands for Research and Development, Engineering, and Materiel.

The Infantry School is discontinuing the Infantry Heavy Mortar Officer course and the Infantry Operations, Intelligence and Reconnaissance course. It is also planning a two-week Infantry Officer's Common Orientation course to replace all present refresher

courses. **New Director** of the TIS Tactical Department is COL. WILLIAM H. BILLINGS, succeeding COL. JOSEPH W. STILWELL, JR. COL. JOHN D. CONE is the new Director of the Department of Non-Resident Instruction, succeeding COL. CLAUDE M. HOWARD.

At the Transportation Training Command, Fort Eustis, Va., Transportation Corps and Corps of Engineers troops are engaged in TRAMTEST—a three months' test of an aerial tram-

way system involving the sea landing, erection, operation, dismantling and storage of a 5,000-foot ship-to-shore cargo-carrying tramway. The tramway is an overhead system of mechanized "sky-cars" which ride on steel cables suspended between 75-foot steel towers.

The new Commandant of The Transportation School is BRIG. GEN. FREDERICK T. VOORHEES. He succeeds COL. WILLIAM B. BUNKER who is now Commanding Officer of the Transportation Supply and Maintenance Command at St. Louis.

New responsibilities came to the Army Quartermaster Corps when the Department of Defense made the Army solely responsible for buying and supplying food for all the military services. This means buying, stocking and delivering about a billion dollars worth of chow every year. It also means procuring and maintaining reserve stocks. The QMC will take over responsibility for all wholesale depot stocks of food in the U. S. and "sell" them to the Army, Navy and Air Force as they are needed.

A welfare fund to be used for "isolated" antiaircraft artillery units has been organized by the Army Antiaircraft Command. Initial allotment to the fund from Army and Air Force Central Welfare Fund was \$50,000 and an additional amount of \$39,500 was received for the first quarter of the 1956 fiscal year. The funds will buy such things as dayroom furnishings and athletic equipment. At least 180 ARAACOM units will qualify for aid. Supervision of the fund is a function of GI, ARAACOM. A council headed by Col. E. T. Ashworth will administer it.





HOW TO CALM EMERGENCIES!

USAF HERCULES



The early presence of U.S. troops in a trouble zone has often prevented disorders and averted actual combat. The important thing is *getting them there in a hurry* to meet any emergency.

The new C-130 Hercules is an excellent airplane for this job. This combat cargo transport carries 92 fully-equipped troops at high speed over long routes in air-conditioned, pressurized cabins which minimize in-flight fatigue.

The Hercules was designed for urgent action. Its unique tail ramp permits troops to run aboard. With its four Allison T56 turboprop engines it takes off in 12 seconds, uses improvised runways for landing troops closer to action.

The Hercules is in quantity production today for the USAF as a paratroop carrier, cargo carrier, troop carrier and airborne ambulance. It's another product of Government Aircraft Plant No. 6, in Marietta, Georgia, America's first turboprop production line for transports.



LOCKHEED

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LET'S MAKE THE ARMY THE FORWARD SERVICE

THE opinion of so many of us that the Army is unpopular with all segments of American civilian society may have been exploded at the annual meeting of the AUSA last month. At that meeting and since, we have become aware that a considerable body of American opinion—industrial, academic, journalistic and political—has been and is disturbed by the tendency to discount the future role of the Army.

How the Army came to think of itself as unwanted is of interest only if we are determined to reverse the trend and not let it happen again. There was no single reason for it. It was partly the natural response of a service that felt slighted by the emphasis put into creating and publicizing the Strategic Air Force and by such concepts as "massive retaliation." Partly also by the fact that Army strength and Army appropriations have been reduced in recent years. And partly too by the undeniable fact that Army service is less attractive with draft-age young men and their parents than the other services. (This overlooks the fact that all military service is viewed with considerable disinterest by most of our youth and Army service only a little more so than the others.)

These reasons are important for the lessons they teach us as we go about the task of making that segment of opinion that doesn't discount the Army larger and more effective.

Some guideposts can be gleamed from the comments of some of the panel members at the meeting.

Mrs. Esther Van Wagoner Tufty made it clear that she thought that even service in the Army can be made more attractive. You must get your story to the mothers of America, she said. She didn't discount the difficulties; it would be "oh, so hard to do" but "if the mother feels good about her son going [into the Army], then you have a wonderful condition."

Mr. Donald Douglas, who whether so cast or not certainly represented air power, was not an anti-Army witness. "I think we certainly need an army," he said. Dr. Henry E. Kissinger of Harvard spoke of the deterrent effect of an army in being. Mr. Willard F. Rockwell, representing industry, spoke of the need for the Army story to be told more widely. He thought an effective job could be done by retired senior officers. And Hanson W. Baldwin of *The New York Times* put the problem where most soldiers would put it: "When you have good leaders the story is told, . . ."

The Benning meeting was reassuring on that point. Mr.

Brucker and General Taylor showed that they were prepared to exert leadership in telling the Army story. We can count on them and other senior officers to tell the high-level story of the Army's importance to the nation. They can and do detail and spell out the dominant role of the Army in all kinds of warfare and as a deterrent to war. They can and do describe the Army's needs and show how they can be met.

THERE are other Army stories that need to be told. The first and foremost is that the Army, more than any other service, is the service in which men control machines and weapons and are not controlled by them. Thus we must tell the Army's story not in terms of close-order drill and kitchen police, but in terms of men using a bewildering array of machines and weapons. We must show the American people that the Army story includes the most advanced technology that science and engineering offer. When the public appreciates that, it will then be ready to appreciate that disciplined, trained fighting men on the ground are the men who win the final victory.

Perhaps it ought to be the other way around. Perhaps the picture of the disciplined and trained rifleman is the picture of the Army the public ought to buy. Unfortunately the American public prefers the wonders of science and engineering more than the art of leadership that molds untrained youth into fighting teams. So let's give the public what it wants, not dishonestly or fraudulently, but matter-of-factly show them that today's fighting soldier depends greatly on new techniques and that he is no mean technician in his own right.

A GOOD example of this kind of story is the relatively new Army Electronic Proving Ground at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. General Taylor recently visited it, as have other senior officers. It is performing a highly important function and all of its story that can be told should be told. On pages 38-39 of this issue we show pictures of one of its projects—obviously a rather simple one and perhaps of less importance than many others. But it has a significance that would be appreciated by civilians. It shows how the age-old problems of scouting and patrolling and target-finding can be performed by combining modern photography, communications and flight. There are so many Army stories of this kind that need to be told widely. It challenges all of us. If we do the job the Army will be the service with the forward look.

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
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
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


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


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


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
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
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
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
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NOT YET TIME TO TURN IN YOUR HAT

As rockets and guided missiles become
the dominant weapons system, the
Army will continue to be
the military force of ultimate decision

"I WOULD turn in my hat right now," said General Eddleman at the annual meeting of the AUSA, "if I thought for a moment that the Army's part in an all-out nuclear war would be a minor one."

We don't think General Eddleman is about to turn in his hat. Nor do we think he or you should. But the forcible way in which he phrased the question of the Army's role in an all-out war of thermonukes certainly leads us to ask whether the idea that such a war will be waged almost exclusively in the air is valid or whether some rethinking is in order. Rethinking—because it seems to be generally accepted today that an all-out thermonuclear war means air war between air fleets of bombers and such air-defense forces as can be pitted against them and with little, if any, participation by surface forces, land or sea.

It is also widely assumed today that defense in such a war will be largely ineffective; that thermonuke-carrying bombers will get through, no matter how much money and effort we spend on early and late electronic warning networks, on faster-than-sound interceptors, on antiaircraft missiles and guns. And since one thermonuke can destroy a city and lay waste an appalling number of square miles, a vigorous defense effort can do little more than inflict token damage on the attackers.

NOT YET TIME

This may be valid up to a point—as of today. But before looking at tomorrow, let's follow the results of this kind of warfare through to the bitter end.

OBVIOUSLY a war of thermonukes offers little prospects of victory, as we usually think of military victory. All that can be hoped for is that those of us who survive will be tough enough to have the will and the energy to pick up the pieces and try to remake some kind of a livable world. The Army's part in the remaking deserves some thought, to which we shall return later on.

IN this discussion we will largely confine ourselves to the Army's role in an all-out thermonuclear war. It will not touch on the obvious role of the Army in being as a deterrent force, as the only force that can put out a brush-fire war, the only force that can limit a war and fashion it to the requirements of national objectives and grand strategy. In this discussion we will talk about something that isn't likely to happen unless an insane man or clique comes to power. All mankind should devoutly hope unlimited thermonuclear war never happens, but it can.

How will the surviving belligerents know that a thermonuclear war is over? By a radio signal from the enemy's supreme headquarters crying "Uncle"? Hardly. An aggressor mad enough to start such a war isn't likely to surrender when all hope is lost. Instead, like Hitler, he is likely to live out his miserable string in his thermonuke-proof in the bowels of the earth, crying vile malefactions on those who have failed and deceived him.

Can we visualize a formal surrender or steps toward an armistice? It seems improbable.

Perhaps the end will be heralded when we realize the enemy bombers are no longer coming over. Perhaps long range reconnaissance planes equipped with photographic and electronic equipment will come back with evidence that all the enemy's bases and cities are wastelands and without sign of life.

At that time the Army will become rather important, will it not? Assuming, of course, that it has been properly safeguarded and has survived. At that time will it not be called into action on two fronts: to help pick up the pieces at home, and to invade and occupy the territory of the enemy? Again, let's disregard the home-front job for a moment and turn our attention to the force we send into the enemy's territory.

The spearheads of that force, if not the whole force and its logistical tail, must be air-transported. This will require an airlift capacity not easily envisaged today, but an actual critical requirement nevertheless.

THAT Army force must go in ready to fight. For if our Army has survived we must assume that the enemy's has too. And it may be willing to fight. For what? it has been asked. The survivors' loved ones are

dead or mangled. The stench of death covers their shambled land. What have they to fight for? Very little, truly. But human beings are illogical and the instinct to survive and to protect what little they have is strong. Indeed, the resistance may be as bitter as that of a wounded animal cornered in its lair. It would be foolish to belittle the capability. And while the enemy could hardly hope to turn the tide, he could make his final subjection costly if the Army force we send in is not superbly trained, highly mobile, and fully armed with the finest weapons and machines we can give it.

Why go after the survivors? you ask. Let them grovel in the stinking ruins of their cities until they expire. But can you be sure that they will expire? Can you be sure of anything until you have men—armed men, soldiers, on the ground?

Let them stick up their heads and we'll plaster them with another thermonuke, you say. What heads? Won't they be here, there, and everywhere—small bands of armed, desperate men—no target for an atomic bomb? Even if you pinpoint a decent-sized band of them, they will hardly be there when the bombers come at your bidding.

But suppose they don't fight? Suppose they are shocked and benumbed into driven cattle? The Army still has a job. And the job of occupying a stricken land where the water in streams and wells, food stocks, and growing plant life may be radioactive staggers the imagination. No matter what the eventuality, the Army's job will be tremendous and without parallel in history.

All this is guessing, you say? So it is. But who can penetrate the dark veil of the future and assure us that it can't happen something like this?

And if it does so happen, will it not be the Army—the soldiers on the ground—that will deliver the blows that achieve the final decision? As armies always have.

NOW let's go back to the homeland and at the time when the war begins—by surprise, unprovoked assault of fleets of thermonuke-carrying bombers.

The signals come in from the far-distant outer edges of the warning net and then from those closer in. We can hope that they will be alert and we can hope that those on the receiving end will believe what they hear. We can hope that there will not be another Pearl Harbor, a much worse one. The interceptors of air defense go into action, the Army's antiaircraft command is alerted, and missile and gun sites are cleared for action. Civil defense sounds its calls and the President prepares to sign proclamations declaring critical areas, perhaps the entire United States, under martial law.

As air bases and industrial complexes reel under the attacks of the bombers that get through, Civil Defense and local police will find themselves swamped. We shouldn't kid ourselves that Civil Defense, as it is now or even as it might become when the need for it is made more apparent to Americans, can do the job

TO TURN IN YOUR HAT

without assistance from the Army. We can be sure that if thermonukes rain down on this fair land of ours, there will be immediate and insistent and desperate cries for Army help—just as after the San Francisco earthquake, after the Texas City explosion, and in the aftermath of Hurricanes Connie and Diane of recent memory.

Who better than the Army is equipped by experience and know-how to evacuate masses of homeless people, to provide them with food, shelter and medical services?

Clearly no man in Army uniform should think for a moment that he will be useless in a war of thermonukes and manned aircraft. It is not yet time to turn in your hat.

WHAT of tomorrow when manned bomber aircraft disappear and the intercontinental ballistic missile replaces them? Will the Army's role be less or even nonexistent? Will it then be time for the soldier to turn in his hat?

Decidedly not. A weapons system of rockets and missiles, ranging from tactical antitank rockets, through all ranges up to and including ICBMs, will retain for the Army the dominant position it has always had as the military force of decision.

We in the Army should never forget and we should constantly reiterate that guided missiles and rockets are artillery, whether antitank weapons or short-ranged Honest Johns and Corporals, or longer-ranged ones up to and including ICBMs; whether Nike antiaircraft weapons or the anti-ICBMs of the future. All of these weapons of the future are launched from the ground and controlled from the ground. If the target is on the ground they are field artillery. If the target is in the air, they are antiaircraft artillery. By definition artillery is the missile-throwing arm of an army and man's weapons too heavy to be carried by a single individual or by

the gun crew. The missiles may be stones, heavy arrows, grapeshot, shrapnel, high explosives, or warheads of fission or fusion materials.

As every new development in guided missiles marks the obsolescence of the manned bomber, so also does it mark advances in Army artillery.

THE tactical and the technical nature of future warfare—its degree of velocity, the expanse of its battlefields, its demands on men and machines—is still so unclear that any attempt to impose artificial limits on the Army's development of rocket and missile artillery would be exceedingly short-sighted. And to do it in the name of unyielding adherence to the highly debatable doctrine that functions can be allocated by imposing range limitations is to fly in the face of every instinct of practical men.

Can those who would impose such limitations say with certainty that on the future battlefield supporting artillery may not have to be sited hundreds of miles away from the supported unit? Can they assure us that guided missiles of all ranges will always be "area weapons" and can never have the accuracy of the 105 howitzer or the even more precise 8-inch howitzer?

Doctrine can't be written on the basis of what someone sees in a clouded crystal ball. Until we know much more about the tactical requirements of the weapons of the future and indeed about the technological refinements that will be made in those weapons, any effort to allocate weapons in terms of range or any other artificial barrier would be a triumph of dogma over common sense.

The point of all this is: as a deterrent force and in war, whether limited or all-out, the Army will have more than an unimportant role.

So don't turn in your hat. There's a lot to be done, and the Army will be doing it.

COMING IN OUR JANUARY ISSUE

HANSON W. BALDWIN

Military Editor, *The New York Times*

Examines the nature of man and of war in

"Land Power as an Element of National Power"

"It is man, with his feet in the mud, sweating, bleeding, indomitable man, who fights land wars with the objective of controlling and dominating the battlefield—the land itself."

"We risk defeat in peace or war if we put all our military eggs in the nuclear basket . . . I believe in land power and its continued validity as an element of national power."

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THE NATURE OF COMMAND

COLONEL J. M. PITZER

- The Navy does not borrow; it holds steadfastly to the belief that it should have for its own everything it needs to carry out its mission.
- The Air Force insists on control of means or methods; if it goes through the air it must be commanded by an Air Force commander. It believes in cooperative efforts by co-equal commanders below theater command levels.
- The Army favors unity of command and welcomes the aid of Navy and Air Force in helping it perform its missions. Unlike the Navy it doesn't insist on owning everything in sight; unlike the Air Force it doesn't have much faith in cooperative effort.
- The position of the American people is generally one of resigned exasperation at what looks like quibbling. It probably would favor the development of a class of officers without service loyalties—men who would owe their allegiance to the President and the Secretary of Defense.

THIS is a consideration of the philosophies of command held today by the Army, Navy, and Air Force, with a view to determining the possibility and merit of a system which would be acceptable and applicable to all.

In all our major formations, command is a partnership affair. It is shared by the titular commander and his staff. Regulations deny this, but any experienced officer knows it is so. Major command responsibilities are too complex for one man; we will not allow him to delegate them to subordinate commanders, and so his staff must share his job. Command becomes multiple. And it is artificial to say that the usual staff officer making a decision is

acting as an *alter ego* of the commander. He is not always sufficiently aware of the commander's thoughts for that. The thoughts he expresses are his own. Perhaps in a strongly led, closely assembled, well-behaved and unreinforced division, command still can be a one-man job, but not in any higher headquarters. And you hardly ever find a division like that any more, and are unlikely to find one on a nuclear battlefield of the future. Maybe some day we will reshuffle military responsibilities to cut command back to one-man size, but that is beside the present point: staff officers are partners in command.

THE War of 1812 furnished several examples of joint effort in the important Great Lakes campaigns. Two were splendid successes of cooperation: the action led by Captain Perry and General Harrison at Lake Erie in 1813, and the decisive victory of Captain MacDonough on Lake Champlain in 1814. Between lay the dismal failure of Niagara, where the naval commander refused to collaborate with land forces, asserting a higher destiny: to fight the enemy's fleet. In fact, he stayed in port and fought no one.

In the Civil War, joint operations continued on the basis of mutual cooperation. Again the results varied. In general, there was success where either the sea or land commander was so prominent that his colleague deferred to him. Secretary of War Stanton felt that independence of the two departments hurt the war effort. However, Stanton's solution was, virtually, that the Army take over. The Navy would have no part of this.

The broth really came to a boil 33 years later in the Spanish-American War. Bickering and lack of coordination appear to have been the rule in that affair. The climax came at Santiago, in the constant and substantial disagreements between General Shafter and Admiral Sampson, principally concerning which force should reduce the forts at the harbor entrance.

There was created in 1903 the Joint Board of the Army and Navy. This was the first systematic American effort to define command relationships in joint operations. The Board's results were published in *Joint Action of the Army and Navy*, the command portions varying in versions of 1927, 1935, and 1938. The first two made increasingly stronger provisions for unity of command. But, where close coordination was not needed, they relied on the old principle of paramount interest—meaning that in joint operations, the paramount interest of one or the other service would be manifest, and intelligent and hearty cooperation would follow spontaneously. Paramount interest lost some ground in the testimony of Admiral Moffett before a Congressional

committee. In explaining how paramount interest could shift during an operation, he said: "If a dispute arose between them at that time it might have to be referred to the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War, and they might have to call on the President. Of course the battle might be over by that time."

Non the revision of 1938, paramount interest disappeared. But, for some reason, unity did too. The 1938 change went back to main reliance on mutual cooperation. Unity of command could be invoked only by the President or by joint agreement in Washington. And so, mutually cooperating, we came to Pearl Harbor.

In World War II, mutual cooperation survived at the top where the forces were commanded by a committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For the theaters of operations mutual cooperation was discarded and unified command prescribed.

The new method did not flourish in the Southwest Pacific. General MacArthur retained substantially an Army staff, augmented by liaison officers from other services. Nor did he provide an over-all tactical commander. Components were expected to cooperate. By and large they did, but one consequence was the near-fatal Battle of Leyte Gulf, where the enemy achieved surprise against one of two cooperating fleets, surprise which a single-command system could have prevented.

Mediterranean matters were directed by a supreme commander with a joint and combined staff. The air, ground and naval commanders served also as deputies on the supreme commander's staff, and their helpers filled active roles in the habitual joint planning of Allied Force Headquarters. This was strong unification at the top, but there was nothing of the sort at lower levels. In the Sicilian operation, task force detailed planning by the separate component commanders did not include sufficient information as to airborne aspects. There followed the tragic loss of airborne troops and planes to our own antiaircraft fire. Reporting on this, the Combined Chiefs of Staff emphasized the personal duty of supervision by some one commander who directly controlled all component forces.

UNIFIED command below the theater level did not exist in Europe, either. As in the Mediterranean, joint efforts at the lower levels proceeded on a cooperative basis. One interesting result was that, much like two businessmen, General Bradley and Admiral Kirk negotiated an agreement covering their respective responsibilities in the *Overlord* assault.

In the theater designated Pacific Ocean Areas, and commanded by Admiral Nimitz, unity of command was most widely applied. Starting with established Navy-Marine Corps landing force doctrine, with time and experience this theater expanded the unity principle until not only theater and its most active subordinate headquarters, but also certain of its lesser task forces were unified commands. Generally each operation had a single commander who was aided by a joint staff in

which the services other than his own were decidedly prominent.

INTERNAL command arrangements for its own sea, land and air forces made the U. S. Navy the forerunner of unified command and joint staffs. The comparatively extensive application of the unity principle to joint forces in the Pacific Ocean Areas theater was simply the logical expansion of existing Navy doctrine by a commander experienced in it.

The Navy has never doubted that it should command and have for its own all such means as it deems necessary to carry out its mission. It does not believe in borrowing. Consistently and successfully it has contended for its existence as a purpose-type command, and has resisted outside efforts to restrict it to particular vehicles, means, or processes.

This strongly functional approach is carried farther in its type-command and task-command doctrines. Training and administration are responsibilities of the type commanders. The type command is the military "home" of personnel and equipment when not engaged in operations. When there is an operation to do, a task commander is designated to plan and execute it. To him are assigned vessels, aircraft and personnel from the type commands, sufficient for the operation at hand. So, relieved of fundamental training and long-range logistical responsibilities, the task commander can concentrate on the tactical enterprise. Commands are not formed solidly around the processes or means by which the forces travel or fight.

UNITED States Air Force command views are faithful to the principle of mass. Cavalry attained its greatest usefulness when maneuvered as a mass. So, also, in the Air Force view of things, should air power be used. That it be divided and frittered away on indecisive missions is their constant concern, and understandably so—with reason.

The most familiar application of air-command doctrine is the case of Strategic Air Command. Air advocates have long desired and successfully maintained command of that force at Department of Defense level. The official statement of the position is to the effect that forces having either missions or capabilities which transcend responsibilities of the theater in which located should be directed by higher authority.

With regard to forces actually assigned to a theater, the Air Force accepts the principle of unified command at theater level, provided the theater commander does not also command his own component force. Co-equal air, ground and sea commanders, under the theater commander, are envisaged. The air command, it is argued, should encompass virtually all flying machines, and particularly those of the Navy and Marine Corps in addition to those of the USAF. Air is noticeably reluctant to accept unity of command in anyone below the theater commander. There is acquiescence for joint task forces on condition that (1) duration, magnitude and

objective are limited, and (2) the force commander does not also command his own component. When it comes to amphibious operations, however, Air will not yield sovereignty. It insists that the participating air commander be co-equal with the joint commander of ground and naval forces. Air officers justify this by observing that an amphibious task force commander is always, additionally, the commander of his own service component. That circumstance the Air Force finds objectionable at any level. In passing, it may be noted that, on experience, the critical phases of joint amphibious operations always are entrusted to naval command.

All this is process-type command doctrine, and with a vengeance. The position very nearly is: if it goes through the air, it is a subject for Air Force command. In this view it is the means, more than the mission, which is important. This contrasts directly with the Navy attitude.

THE U. S. Army's view of command is founded on the belief that wars will always be decided on land because that is where people, who decide them, live. Army would not object and, indeed, should greatly appreciate and fully credit the action of Air or Navy in clearing the way to that decision. But Army belief simply cannot be induced now, any more than it was by the popular beliefs of 1940, that machines, flying or otherwise, have wholly or even predominantly taken the place of men. The bloody experience of fifteen years nourishes the Army view that final decision will come on the ground battlefield.

There is also growing Army concern for the victor's survival upon land. Usually the Army has sufficient tact to refrain from open statements that air and sea forces are designed to support it. But there is no doubt, nevertheless, of the Army view that in battle it should command sufficient of the means of the other services to permit their immediate employment against such targets as the ground commander deems essential. Small wonder, then, that Army unreservedly favors unity of command, without particular quibble as to level or other limiting factors.

CLOSE air support is a main object of Army concern. This means of furthering the ground campaign is of vast importance to the Army, for the dual purposes of attrition and morale. And the Army's concern for it runs directly contrary to Air Force doctrine that little or no close support is possible until the air supremacy campaign is won.

In sum, the Army doctrine of command is not precisely that of either of its sister-services. With the Navy, it believes in single command over all means needed for the mission: in this case, control of the land. Unlike the Navy, it does not insist on owning all the means for such a functional command. Like the Air Force, it favors process-type command in so far as organic forces are concerned. Unlike the Air Force, it has no great faith in cooperative battle effort.

THE attitude of the American public on the matter of military command bears an air of exasperation. Acting through their elected representatives, our people have relegated the Joint Chiefs of Staff to their statutory role as advisers, and have fixed a line of responsibility through the civilian heads of the Department of Defense and the service departments. It was probably neither a grasp for power, nor fear of the rise of a "man on horseback," which led to this. The background and character of the President who authored the change are proof against that. The reason for establishing this system of top unified command by civilians seems to have been to strengthen control. Not necessarily *civilian* control, just plain control. Whatever the drawbacks, at least a system now exists where a true and timely command decision can be reached short of the President. Top command no longer is a matter of committee compromises.

IN 1925, on request of the Secretaries of War and Navy, the President appointed a board to study and advise on the best means of developing aircraft in national defense. The board's extensive hearings included testimony from an outstanding flyer, Major Horace M. Hickam. He said:

" . . . nothing short of a department for defense . . . with a new race of commanding officers skilled in the operations of armies, navies, and air forces as our generals now operate infantry, cavalry, and artillery, with the necessary staff—nothing short of that will meet the situation; and, I am sure, we will get it when we are in the middle of a war.

" . . . there is a general tendency toward specialization in every walk of life. . . . We are getting a new type of man—that is, a man who coordinates their work. . . . I believe we must develop a general staff who are skilled in the handling of armies, navies, and air forces, and who are capable of laying out a campaign, and of using all these forces, either separately or with one another."

UNITY of command has been praised and neglected for generations. It is the official military ideal for top field command. Above and below that level there is disagreement. Yet there are signs of clarification in command doctrine. In the eyes of some, modern war has established the singleness of purpose of all military effort; there is recognition that such single-service activities as sea blockade and strategic air bombardment attain real success only when strong pressure is applied simultaneously by ground forces. In a word, some see the military forces as just one enterprise instead of three, and each military operation as a joint operation for a single purpose instead of three. So seen, it plainly follows that command of the whole enterprise and of each operation can be single. The alternatives to single command are either continued begging and borrowing between services (mutual cooperation, it used to be called), or else the diversification of Air Force and Army into self-sufficient, purpose-type forces like the present Navy

(Continued on page 46)



Miss Marilyn Monroe in Korea. She can help only after the boys have been made men by the Army

HOLLYWOOD CAN'T MA

WERE going to saturate Eighth Army with entertainment," a dramatic news bulletin announces to the jubilant troops in Korea and their somewhat elated wives and mothers back in the ZI. "New USO shows featuring some of the biggest names in Hollywood make their way overseas," another reports. "We're going to buck up the morale of the boys in service," says a cheese-cakey, publicity-seeking starlet, flashing a nylon leg and a shapely bosom.

USO shows, doughnut-dispensing Red Cross girls, and big-name entertainers are all well and good. But if this dependency upon glossy gadgets rather than old-fashioned leadership properly conceived, dedicated and applied is the way to make soldiers count

me out. *Soldiers* know—or should know—that leadership applied long before the shows, long before the shrimp cocktails at the end of the LOC, long before the confusion of R&R is what makes fighting soldiers and fighting teams.

Leadership cannot be exerted through starlets, iced beer and PXs loaded with luxuries. Nor can such sugar-coated influences give us the morale, *esprit*, and discipline we must have when we face the enemy. These qualities come only through the application of sound precepts of leadership at all levels of command—starting with the squad.

How do you charge up a unit so that it can stand tall? polish brass and shine shoes like the Arlington guard? fight like demons against the enemy?

act like soldiers on all occasions? What's the magic formula? What does it take to make a group of men a military unit and proud of it?

IT can be done if we remember one thing: *Soldiers* expect to be treated like soldiers. This may sound strange to some of our latter-day advocates of little discipline, loose standards, and the philosophy of "Everything's OK; just don't get caught at it."

The word "soldier" makes a new recruit think of discipline and "regimentation." Long before he entered the Army he had gotten the word from father or elder brother about what to expect from officers and noncoms. So he comes into the Army ready to act like a soldier if he is treated like one.

And if he isn't so treated he will be disappointed, and won't turn out to be much of a soldier.

Treating a man like a soldier is what makes him one. The word "soldier" means all the things we in the military profession hold dear. You call a man of medicine a doctor; a man of science a scientist; a man of letters or art or music an artist. But the man of the Army, from general to private, is a soldier; proudly so if he is as accomplished in his trade as the others are in theirs. A soldier is unlike a civilian because he is dedicated to duty and has taken an oath of fealty to his country that can demand the last full measure of service.

To treat men like soldiers is to train and discipline them and make them part of the military chain of command. This chain is not based on a system of rule by coordination, or leadership by vote. It comes through putting faith

**LT. COL. EDWARD M.
FLANAGAN, JR.**

in subordinates; giving them a job and letting them do it; making standards high and the directions minimum; giving officers and noncommissioned officers alike confidence in themselves and the knowledge that you have the ability to back them up.

To make a military unit of a group of civilians, to make a unit military and not a firm of J. Mortar & Sons, Lobbers of Shells, we at unit levels—company, battalion, and regimental commanders—can do many things.

THE list might go something like this. Battalion retreat parades weekly, say every Wednesday, with maximum participation, including cooks, supply men,

personnel clerks, and *all* officers. The ceremony should follow the drill manual. Let NCOs run them occasionally. Dependents should be encouraged to attend. For retreat parade use the band or, far better, form a battalion drum-and-bugle corps. Impossible? It takes only 18 men, much enthusiasm, and constant pressure by a CO to get a D&B corps started. The results after only a month's practice can be truly remarkable. The men need have no previous formal musical training, nor do they need to spend all day long beating drums and blowing bugles. It is amazing how the morale of an entire unit soars when it marches to retreat parade behind its own D&B corps. Dress the band in the issue uniform but add scarves, belts, white bootlaces and painted helmet liners to make them sparkle and look different. And if you can get competition going between D&B corps on a battalion level, the

KE SOLDIERS

The way to make a man a
soldier is to
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Furthermore, he
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result will be even more remarkable. That really happened at a two-battalion post in Japan. The infantry battalion and the artillery battalion each turned out musical groups that were the pride of the units. A drum-and-bugle corps is feasible on the battalion level if enough enthusiasm is generated and if all COs give it full support.

ANOTHER way to build unit *esprit* is to have some distinctive article of civilian apparel for wear off duty. One battalion's officers had Palm Beach jackets with their (locally designed and obtained) battalion insignia on the upper left pocket. One battalion of an infantry regiment had red vests with their insignia on them. Another unit had ties which incorporated the regimental crest in the design.

Another tangible asset is the company or battery mascot. One of the most publicized was a parachute-jumping bear, owned by a battery in Korea and Japan. Mascots have included a crow, a monkey (they always make the fatal mistake of climbing a descending parachute), goats, or any other animal which the men can associate with their unit.

Another way to spur competition within a battalion is to designate the best company or battery each week. It can be selected in a number of ways, but the most effective is to grade each unit on a variety of items at the Saturday morning inspection: mess hall, supply room, men in ranks, barracks, day room, weapons, motor vehicles, best lines at parade, and so on. The standards must have been set previously, and the units must meet them. Each is rated by the staff officer making the inspection (one point for the best, and so on down the line). The unit with the best rating for a month is given the battalion streamer at a weekly retreat parade, and keeps the streamer until it is ousted from its position. The weekly standing is also posted on an attractive sign in the battalion area (preferably in front of the CP so that the best unit is known throughout the area).

CUSTOMS also grow up in certain units which tend to weld members together. In one battalion, its commander inspects his staff each morning in front of his CP. Then he and his principal staff go to the battalion area for the battalion formation, the first of the day. Batteries are called to at-

tention at the CO's arrival, report to him, and receive orders for the day. Battery commanders inspect their units and the CO and his staff make spot checks as necessary. Maximum attendance is required at this formation, and only the CO and barracks guard are excused. This formation, which takes only about fifteen minutes, including inspection of men in ranks with their weapons if desired, is followed by the day's routine training. The formation serves to weld the unit together, gives each CO in the chain a chance to see his men, and gives the men a chance to see their COs. It starts the day in a military manner.

Competition should also be encouraged in training. Battery or company tests, and speed and accuracy trials for crew-served weapons squads pay off in interest and spirit.

CERTAIN intangible procedures, not so definite as those I have described, make a unit outstanding. For instance, when the unit as a whole has done particularly well, it's up to the CO to let his men know it. In the unit which has the morning formation this is easy. The CO merely calls the men about him after the report is in and gives them the information. He can also keep his men abreast of the situation. This should not interfere with the chain of command, and should be reserved for important occasions.

Along with all these ideas there must be discipline—discipline of the so-called old school of thought. Punishment must be deserved and prompt, but just and equitable. It can be administered within the legality of the UCMJ in such a way that men prefer to do the correct thing. One way of insuring equality is by using an extra-duty platoon where all men in the battalion who have been given extra duty perform that duty under the supervision of noncoms detailed to the platoon for a week at a time. If the NCOs have been properly indoctrinated and are aware of their responsibilities, there is no need for an officer to supervise the formation.

MORALE, *esprit*, discipline and training are still the responsibility of the commander. That responsibility cannot be delegated to the USO, the Red Cross, or Hollywood purveyors of "something for the boys." Those things come after the officers and noncoms have done their jobs.

Let's All Fly on Platforms

Captain John G. Mantaras

At the risk of incurring the wrath of all paratroopers, I will assert that they are obsolete. No one can deny their glorious role in past combat, but they have served their purpose and should be replaced.

At best, jumping out of aircraft to execute a vertical envelopment is haphazard and sloppy. Bones are broken, equipment becomes damaged and lost, entire plane loads of men and supplies are shot down, and those that do land are often scattered all over hell's half acre. I think that when surprise is the prime requisite, much of it is lost in a daylight drop, though during darkness the chances for surprise are somewhat enhanced. At best, confusion generated in the drop zones by unexpected shifts of wind and losses in the air and on the ground makes reorganization difficult and time-consuming. Remember, too, that airborne troops have been used successfully for quite some time, and to the normal hazards we must add the many anti-airborne measures that have been developed.

The helicopter might be used for vertical envelopment, but in its present form it is limited by the number of men and the amount of equipment it can carry. It is fair game for automatic-weapons fire, and even concentrated small-arms fire could have a devastating effect. On a limited scale and in specific situations it fills the bill, but as a replacement for the paratrooper it is not practical. Lately, designers have come up with a combination of strap-on wings and engine, and more recently the Navy has tested the Flying Platform. With a few modifications and some further development, this is the item that replaces the paratrooper's present transportation.

The platform is so simple it does not require elaborate controls. A lever pivots the platform, and the pilot need only lean to bring his craft to any desired direction. He need not worry about capsizing or causing the platform to plummet to earth by leaning



too far, because it is so balanced that it won't. If you can walk, you can fly the platform.

This vehicle now costs between \$1,500 and \$2,000, and might be mass-produced for somewhere around \$500. Speed and range are very limited. It can operate for only twenty minutes at a speed of 35 mph, but steps are being taken to increase both range and speed. The platform is very light: a two-man load, and even with small wheels added one man can push it.

The possibilities in the use of the platform might become enormous. Gone would be the risk of losing entire platoons before they had a chance to jump. Broken bones and smashed equipment would be eliminated. The problem of reorganization in the DZ would be completely erased, and the lack of mobility after a jump wouldn't be a problem. Terrain heretofore considered unsuitable for a DZ would be ideal for the platform soldier. The mo-

bility provided would be fantastic. Vertical envelopment and surprise would be complete.

The platform could be used on patrols, to direct traffic, for liaison work, for spotting artillery fire, and for countless other tasks. What better way to make our fighting troops airborne than with a machine of this type?

In the beginning there would be problems of logistics, organization, employment, and training. However, these should be no greater than those encountered when the first parachute and glider units were organized. The training problem should become simplified, because only fifteen minutes would be needed to teach a man to fly this machine.

Finally, I believe the platform could lend itself to any type of organization we care to create—RCTs, divisions, or any special units with which the Army may be now experimenting. Let's all get airborne with Flying Platforms!

Don't Give Up the REGIMENT

COLONEL CARLETON E. FISHER

***The advantages of the
regiment need not be
lost in creating
Atomic Age infantry units***

WHEN Exercise SAGE BRUSH is finally evaluated, a few months from now, we can expect that the decision will be made either to retain our present infantry regiment or change to the combat command concept.

What advantages (and disadvantages) does the combat command concept have over the regimental concept? To get the answer we must agree on just what regimental organization we are using in our comparison. Recent tests suggest that battalions will not be tied to the logistical, administrative or combat support of regimental companies as our current T/O&E units are. Part of the service support currently furnished by the regimental service company has been placed in each battalion, and part has been concentrated in the division support command. The tank companies of the regiments have been formed into a separate tank battalion. Therefore, it appears that a regiment composed of a headquarters company and a number of battalions should be used as the unit of comparison. Such a regiment could contain any number of battalions, but for discussion let's consider a three-battalion regiment (see Figure 1). The command relationship of the combat command

headquarters, infantry battalions, and tank battalions being tested during Exercise SAGE BRUSH is shown in Figure 2.

If the regimental headquarters company is organized in the same way as the combat command headquarters, and if the battalions are identical, the only difference between this regimental concept and the combat command is that the battalions are organic in the regimental organization. It follows, then, that the only area of controversy is whether the battalion should be organic to the regiment, or separate organizations, and attached as needed.

WHY has there been disagreement over this, since it would appear that cold logic would indicate whether or not the combat command concept is definitely superior to that of the regiment? There are, I believe, two factors. The first is an inability to conceive of a regiment without separate companies. Apparently, there is a belief that a regiment becomes one by having separate companies such as the service company and the mortar company. A superficial examination of the historical evolution of our regiment will show that this is not so.

The second factor is psychological. Some officers hesitate to advocate the retention of our regimental tradition, since they fear they may stand accused of being out of step with the times, and old-fashioned. I have the impression that part of the agitation for change lies in the human desire of some men to impress their superiors with their "forward-looking-ness." So they say that a change must be made for the sake of mobility and flexibility. Those two words are very much in

vogue today. We need a clearer conception of what flexibility and mobility mean.

THE mobility of a unit is largely determined by the amount and type of equipment which the unit uses and not by the way it is organized. Since we assume that the regimental and combat command organizations are to be similarly equipped, their mobility must be the same. Flexibility, the second objective of the combat command advocates, seems to be the basic argument used to support their organizational idea. But let us analyze the problem to see exactly how much more flexible the combat command is than the regiment. The commander of a division organized on the combat command concept must issue an operations order showing the organization of the combat commands when he commits his forces. Thus, a combat commander tailors his committed forces to the mission. On the other hand, by issuing an operations order the regiment can also be tailored for the mission. In this light the regimental organization is just as flexible as the combat command since the same simple procedure—an operations order—will form the same force.

IT is important to note how the combat command organization was used during World War II. Seventy-five per cent of the time during combat, the same battalions (both armored infantry and tank) operated under the same combat command. If the battalions of a regiment had not been tied to logistical and service support of the regimental companies, I believe the regimental organization would have been

used instead of the combat command. Such a procedure would square with the principle that units should be organized in the manner most frequently employed. To meet special situations, the required detachments and attachments can be made.

The combat command does have one advantage over the regiment—a psychological rather than an organizational advantage. Since the battalions of a division organized on the combat command principle are not organic to the individual combat commands, the division commander may feel freer than a regimental commander to move the battalions from one command to another.

The regimental concept of organization has two important advantages over the combat command concept. The first is responsibility. Man will continue to be an important factor in war, whether conventional or nuclear. Therefore, his behavior and the means of controlling his actions are not to be treated lightly. In the regimental organization the battalion commander is always directly responsible to the regimental commander for his actions, whether operating with the regiment or attached to another unit. The combat command organization, certainly, does not have such a close chain of responsibility. If a battalion frequently moves from one combat command to another and is not performing satisfactorily, there is a tendency for the combat command commander to tolerate such performance, since the unit is not an organic part of his command. These shortcomings can lead to a situation where the combat commander may blame battle failure on the fact that he was not responsible for the training of the units assigned him.

The regimental commander, on the other hand, can and expects to be held responsible at all times for the behavior of his battalions, whether in their organic or attached role. It should be remembered that even when operating with a different regiment, the battalion commander continues to work hard to impress his own regimental commander.


ALTHOUGH experts on organization might consider the principle of span of control separately, I connect it with responsibility. It is difficult to speak of control without linking it to responsibility. Authorities agree that there is a limit to the number of subordinates

which one person can effectively supervise and control. There are some who say that the leader's span of control ranges from five to seven subordinates. This being the case, the combat command concept with the large number of subordinates reporting directly to the division commander violates this principle. Even the advocates of the combat command system admit this violation by agreeing that the combat command headquarters is necessary to control the battalions for the division commander during combat. The regimental organization has the advantage of using the span-of-control principle in assisting the division commander in his responsibilities on a continuous basis.

Responsibility is a two-edged sword. It is the duty of a regimental command-

er to fight for his battalions. I am sure you all know how much more readily something can be accomplished by "The Colonel" than by the commander of a separate battalion. Human nature is such that most officers will fight harder for the units that are organic to their command than for those that occasionally pass through their hands. Although some officers may consider this relatively unimportant, it should be remembered that a tight chain of command (or responsibility) has always been one of the marks of an efficient unit. And the regimental organization is definitely endowed with more responsibility for subordinate units than the combat command.

TRADITION is the second advantage of the regimental organization. The



historic exploits of a unit are the very foundation on which *esprit de corps* is built. There is no question that the regiment is uniquely able to exploit tradition to the fullest extent. The adoption of the combat command concept would not have this distinct advantage, although the present battalions could assume the regimental names and designations. I shall discuss later the problems of redesignating battalions. Just how much value can be placed on *esprit*? During our military careers, we have all heard that a force with *esprit* and the will to win can defeat a much larger force. History has recorded many examples of a determined force winning battles against a larger, better-equipped force. Certainly we must exploit *esprit* to the fullest possible extent.

How much is tradition worth to a unit? Some officers will contend that without *esprit* the combat unit has little value. Others will not fully agree, and will argue that it is important. Much depends upon the commander. Brigadier General Paul M. Robinett, USA, Retired, an authority on military history, who has commanded both a regiment and a combat command, says that a unit with a long record of achievements is worth twenty-five per cent more, and that even a unit with only a little history has a ten per cent advantage. Since it is difficult to measure the worth of tradition to a unit, it is not possible to say it will increase a unit's ability to win by ten, twenty, or thirty per cent. However, if it is agreed that it will help only ten per cent, is it not worthwhile? The Army has just spent millions of dollars testing new concepts of organization. It is expected that the new organization will be more effective. Whether it will be ten, fifteen, or twenty per cent better than the present is unknown. But if it is ten per cent more effective and yet at the same time we drop the regimental tradition (which I conservatively estimate to be worth ten per cent) we break even. We could gain by keeping the regiment and the benefits of the new organization.

ALTHOUGH some will admit that the regimental concept has had distinct advantages over other organizations in the past, they say all that must be forgotten if we are to fight a nuclear war successfully. But the true historian believes that a study of the past is a key to the future. Since man is

still admitted to be a vital factor, a look into the past may be worthwhile because the nature of man has changed little during the centuries. If we ask whether our Army has ever before been faced with a major problem of reorganization because of a significant change in weapons, the answer is yes.

In the Revolutionary War the principal weapon of the infantry was the musket, with an effective range of not over one hundred yards. The regiments (or battalions, for the two terms were virtually synonymous) were small by today's standards. In 1775 the authorized strength was 728 officers and men, organized into ten companies. Because of the short range of the musket and the tactics employed, troops would form a line shoulder to shoulder for the attack. The "colonel" of the regiment was supposed to control the actions of the whole unit personally.

In the 1850s the introduction of the minié ball, and other advances in firearms, forced the infantry to adopt dispersed formations. The majority of regiments during the Civil War were still composed of ten companies, but with an authorized strength of 1,046 officers and men. It is interesting to note that, years after the war, Major General John M. Schofield held that the regimental organization was cumbersome because it was too large for the colonel and his staff to control personally. In addition, the wars in Europe had shown that the frontage an entire regiment had once held was now occupied by one third of a regiment. In 1890 the Secretary of War urged the adoption of a regiment of three battalions. However, it took the Spanish-American War to force the reorganization of the regiment into three battalions.

In World War I, the use of large numbers of machine guns and greatly improved field artillery forced another change in warfare. Never again could men expect to bunch up and survive. Consequently, the detailed organization of the regiment underwent a change.

THIS bit of history shows that as new weapons were added to the arsenal of war, tactical formations became more and more dispersed. This is exactly what most officers agree is going to happen when we deploy on an atomic battlefield. If a change in tactics requires that the term "regiment" be discarded, why wasn't the term dropped years ago when other

changes in organization were made? Could it be that the change in name was not required but that a change in organization and unit function was the solution? If we redesignate our present regiments as combat commands, would they function differently? Only so far as changes in organization and tactics are concerned. Then it follows that it is not a change in name that is required, but rather a change in organization and method of operation.

Today we have battalions which have inherited the histories of regiments, but if all our regiments, as we know them, give up their designations to battalions, only one third of the battalions would receive the numbers of regiments. The remaining battalions would have to receive new numbers, although the lineage of each would also be derived from the parent regiment. This three-way split of the present regiment would create such a large number of new battalions that designations would run to four digits. It is difficult to picture either an officer or an enlisted man working up as much enthusiasm for the 1033d Battalion as for the 103d Infantry.

There remains the question of organization if the new division should have seven, eight, or nine infantry battalions. Let us assume that the division will have two tank battalions as presently found in the test division. A seven-battalion division could be organized into two infantry regiments of three infantry battalions each, and one armored regiment of one infantry and two armored battalions. An eight-battalion division could be organized into two infantry regiments of four infantry battalions each and an armored regiment of two tank battalions. The nine-battalion division could have two infantry regiments of four infantry battalions each and one armored regiment of one infantry battalion and two tank battalions.

No matter how many infantry battalions the division may have, they can be organized most effectively into the framework of the regimental organization. The advantages of this organization demonstrate that the regiment, and not the combat command, offers the best solution to our combat forces organization. The psychological advantage which accrues to the commander of the combat command can never outweigh the advantages of authority, control, responsibility, and tradition inherent in the regimental concept.

The Sheep and the Goats, Or Why Penalize the Over-Specialized?

LIEUTENANT COLONEL TOCSIN

ARE you a prospective sheep, or do you irrevocably belong among the goats? If you are a regular with more than thirteen years of commissioned service, you are one or the other, whether you know it or not. And your chances of being a goat as you approach the halfway mark in your military career are just about fifty-fifty.

It's easy enough for you to tell which group you belong to. If you have attended or have been selected to attend the Command and General Staff College at Leavenworth, you can baa with the best of sheep. But if you haven't, you're a goat, and your eligibility for the responsible assignments for which graduation from Leavenworth is a criterion—not to mention your eligibility to attend the higher service schools—has gone with the proverbial wind. So has your chance of attaining the exalted ranks for which such responsible assignments and higher schooling provide the basis of selection.

The question which has to be answered is this: Does the method of selecting students for the CCSC take men from the upper fifty per cent of the officer corps? This question has to be answered for the good of the service rather than for the good of the individual officer. This is true for reasons that do not have to be belabored.

In the soldier's trade many are called but few are chosen. To put it another way, many wear bars who can

You're a goat if you don't pass through the portals of Grant Hall before the end of your fifteenth year of service



*It isn't necessarily so that over-specialization
is an officer's own fault. Sometimes he is
kept on a certain kind of job because he is good at it*

never get stars. So far as the higher service schools are concerned, although it would be nice to put every officer through every course, the number of students selected is unavoidably limited by available facilities and by course curricula which should maintain high standards. It is not the fact of selectivity with which there can be any quarrel, but the method.

According to the book, officers are eligible for Leavenworth between their eighth and fifteenth years of commissioned service, or before becoming forty-one years old, whichever is sooner. Each arm or service is allotted a quota, which is further broken down within the arm or service according to years of service. A prospective student thus competes for selection only with other officers of the same arm or service and the same length of commissioned service.

Within the combat arms, officers of each of these "year groups" are arranged in an "order of merit." Basically, their standing in this order is determined by six factors: overall efficiency index (OEI), high-level staff experience, experience as a service school instructor, troop duty, command experience, and combat service.

This certainly seems comprehensive enough, but the respective factors are not weighted equally. Therefore, no matter how outstanding a record an officer may have had in one category of duty, it may not balance a lack of experience in some other more heavily weighted category. Also, some types of duty combine other types with them. For example, an officer commanding troops is gaining credit in three categories (command, troop duty, and OEI), while the officer in any other assignment is getting credit only in two, that is, OEI and credit for whatever his assignment may be.

Certainly, it is right to give extra credit for troop and command assignments. The payoff of any military career is the ability to command troops in battle. No one can deny that in

working with anything as nebulous as the future capability of officers in untried situations, the best approach is to check their past records in related activities. And it is obviously important that all officers should have a wide variety of peacetime experience. Only thus can they be reasonably prepared to function effectively in a wartime army.

At the same time, the circumstances of the last fifteen years should not be ignored. During that time the Army has been involved in two wars, two expansions, and two reductions. With such unstable conditions, there has been only limited opportunity to develop officers' careers deliberately and according to an approved pattern.

Indeed, for a time there was an increased tendency to stereotype many individuals in one specialty or another. A senior commander receiving an officer replacement was tempted to put him into a job he already knew. It made for a smoother-running outfit. But for the individual officer, if he was the kind who follows the good soldier's creed and took whatever job he was given to do, the cumulative effect of a succession of such experiences was that, in spite of himself, he became a specialist of concentrated but narrow experience. This was bad for him and, in the long run, bad for the Army, because, no matter how able he might be, lack of varied service can sharply limit his schooling and therefore his future chances and his future usefulness.

The point is that it just isn't necessarily so that an officer who is deficient in varied assignments has only himself to blame. Some officers do avoid certain types of assignment, but many a man has been kept in a certain type of work simply because he is good at it, no matter how loudly he thirsted for new experience.

This problem is especially acute for officers who have had a preponderance of duty away from troops. Important as actual troop or command experi-

ence unquestionably is, it is still a fact that a man whose experience is principally staff may be a potentially able battle commander. In support of this, consider the records of the past three Chiefs of Staff. General Collins had only one assignment with troops between 1920 and 1941; General Ridgway had only staff or school assignments from 1932 until 1942; and General Taylor had only seven months with troops between 1927 and 1942. All these proved themselves to be aggressive, brilliant, spectacularly successful commanders in combat.

Certainly some men whose peacetime service was principally on staffs fell flat on their faces as commanders in combat. But some of the battlefield failures were men with years of peacetime troop duty behind them. What it boils down to is that, given a basic competence in branch and command skills, success as a commander depends mainly on the character, the personality, and the intellect of the man himself.

DESPITE all this, it remains that the surest guide to an officer's future capabilities is the record of his past performance. The emphasis given to varied service should clearly be continued.

However, combining this emphasis with the years-of-service ceiling as a basis for selection creates an inconsistency. It may not be worthwhile to debate whether all officers have fully shown their potential value to the Army after fifteen years of service. But the fact is that, under the circumstances now existing and which can be expected to continue for the next few years, the fifteen-year limit does impose an arbitrary limitation. And we should note that it really isn't fifteen years, but thirteen: an officer commissioned in 1941 must complete the course before the end of fifteen years of service, which means that the last regular class he can attend is the one beginning in the fall of 1955. But that class was selected early in 1955, on the basis of their records up to the time of their latest efficiency report—the one rendered through the spring of 1954. Thus, after thirteen years of service, not fifteen, the books are closed.

AN 8-ball is an 8-ball whether he has thirteen or fifteen years of service. But it is not the definite 8-balls we are worried about; it is the able but over-

specialized officer. During such a two-year period an outstanding officer could pick up plenty of experience which, with his other qualifications, might place him well up on the order of merit. But under the system in effect, a lieutenant colonel who was commissioned in 1941 and who has been successfully commanding a battalion for the past two years could conceivably have been cut out in the selection process because of "lack" of command or troop experience.

Such a system, at least as applied to the period of unstable conditions for the Army since the beginning of World War II, certainly has some unrealistic aspects. It can well be argued that a system based even on a ceiling of fifteen years of service is unrealistic as well. If there must be a ceiling, it would seem to be sounder to base it on grade than on years of service; eligibility could more logically be limited, for example, to officers below the grade of colonel.

There has, in fact, been a definite command effort to correct deficiencies in officers' experience. This is a good thing, but it has come too late to help many individuals if the fifteen-year rule continues in effect. Another sound step which has been taken is to review officers' records two years before they become eligible to attend Leavenworth so as to guide their assignments into a balanced pattern while there is yet time to do so. Again, while this is splendid for the future, it does nothing to help the officer who is laboring under the greatest disadvantage—that is, the man who is the victim of the circumstances making for overspecialization during the past fifteen years.

IT is true that some recognition has been given to the plight of such individuals. Men with unbalanced experience but outstanding records can be moved to a higher place on the order of merit than the literal application of the scoring system permits. It is also

true that, on approval of the Chief of Career Management Division, schooling prerequisites for selection to the top-level service schools can be waived. While it is certainly a good thing to provide flexibility in the application of any system, both these methods might be said to be rather drastic. Given "normal," stable conditions of service, there is nothing inherently wrong with the system as prescribed. It does not need to be set aside for exceptional individuals; it only needs to be modified until a temporary condition—the existence of a relatively large number of overspecialized officers whose eligibility for Leavenworth will be lost before they have had time to eliminate the deficiencies in their experience—can be corrected.

This modification can be easily accomplished by two actions: suspension of the fifteen-year ceiling, and resumption of the system of giving equivalent credit for service schools.

If the fifteen-year ceiling were abolished, at least until conditions become settled enough to permit the pursuit of a well-balanced career pattern, there would be a number of beneficial results to the Army and to its individual members. Overspecialized officers would have time to broaden their qualifications. The result would be a broader base from which the Army could make its selections for advanced schools. It could pick its students more exclusively on the basis of ability than is now the case, when breadth of experience can conceivably outweigh ability which, while specialized, is of a high order.

It should be mentioned that an effort has been made to protect the specialist, in that a pro-rated share of each arm's schools quota is reserved for specialists, who compete for selection only among themselves. But the basis of selection among specialists is made up of the same six factors used for the selection of nonspecialists. Again, therefore, a specialist lacking in one or more of the six factors is hurting almost as

badly as if he were not recognized as a specialist. What is needed is not so much a way of handling specialists in a separate category as a system giving everyone time to be tried in all major types of duty.


THE Army must make every effort, after all, to develop to the full the qualifications of as many of its ablest officers as possible. By stressing the importance of being well rounded and by providing an opportunity for the band of lost souls who inadvertently became specialists as a result of the career ups and downs of the past fifteen years, it can increase its chance of attaining this objective.

As for returning to the World War II system of awarding equivalent credit for service schools on the basis of actual performance of duty, it can be contended that such a step would also help achieve the objective of developing an officer corps of maximum qualifications. If the way equivalent credit was awarded in the past was faulty, the standards could be altered. By granting equivalent credit, the number of officers eligible for assignments which require completion of higher schools and the number of officers eligible for routine consideration for the top schools would increase, with clear advantage to the Army and to individuals.

ADOPTION of these two steps—removing the length-of-service ceiling on eligibility and reviving the award of equivalent credit based on actual experience—would counteract the unfortunate effects on some individuals of what has been a hectic period so far as career development is concerned. It would markedly increase the chance that an error which might have been made would not be perpetuated. It would do much for the morale of a large number of fine officers who now feel that they have been permanently branded as goats before they have gone even halfway through their careers.


Since the morale of its officers is important to the Army's effectiveness, this alone would benefit the Army. Ignoring the individual, however, the Army would benefit still more greatly, for it would then be discarding arbitrary and unrealistic limitations with which it has hampered itself and would be taking steps to permit it to realize the full potentials of all its manpower assets.

*By removing the length-of-service ceiling on eligibility
and reviving the award of equivalent credit
the morale of fine officers who now feel that they are
permanently branded as goats would be renewed*



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
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TODAY'S MILITARY SERVICES, WITH THEIR TREMENDOUS TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES MADE POSSIBLE THROUGH SCIENCE, OFFER A VITAL REWARDING CAREER



Malnutrition and exposure brought on diseases that swamped the limited hospital facilities and exhausted medical supplies

The Glory and Tragedy of Bataan

MAJOR LOUIS MORTON

The tragedy of the "Battling Bastards of Bataan" was the twin horsemen of starvation and disease. Their glory was that they were not defeated by the enemy and, like the men of Valley Forge faced deprivation and adversity with unflinching courage.

THE United States suffered one of the most disastrous defeats in its history on 9 April 1942, when 75,000 American and Filipino soldiers surrendered to the enemy on the battlefield of Bataan.

Time and the more recent events in Korea have dimmed the story of the men who passed into captivity on that day. But their brave stand gave inspiration and hope to the American people in a dark hour.

Now, almost fourteen years later, Bataan continues to shine brightly as a symbol of heroism and human endurance in the face of adversity. For the men who surrendered at Bataan were not defeated by the enemy; in the final analysis they were beaten by starvation and disease.

Three months before, on 6 January, 80,000 men under General Douglas MacArthur had completed one of the most skillful withdrawals on record. But having reached the mountainous jungle of Bataan Peninsula, they were trapped. East, south and west of them was the sea; to the north was the enemy who controlled the air and the sea and who thus cut off communication

with the outside world. From Bataan there could be no retreat. Nor was there real hope for aid from outside. In this situation, the end was clearly inevitable. Yet the Americans settled down to resist the enemy.

The most serious problem facing General MacArthur after he had established his defensive lines was the shortage of food. Because 26,000 civilians had followed the army into Bataan, the quartermaster had to feed 106,000 persons—a population equal to that of South Bend, Indiana. An inventory of supplies disclosed that there was sufficient to feed this number of persons for only thirty days, the month of January. Thus, virtually the first official action was a reduction by half the normal field ration. This gave the Americans 36 ounces of food per day, the Filipinos 32 ounces.

A month later, with half the food supplies gone, the daily ration was cut again. And finally, in March, when another reduction was made, the ration was barely enough to sustain human life.

How inadequate this diet was becomes clear by the records of 25 March. On that day each man received 8.5 ounces of rice, 1.5 ounces of flour, 1.5 ounces of

salt, 2.5 ounces of canned meat and milk, and .5 ounce of sugar—a total of 14.5 ounces. Issued at that rate, the food would last until the middle of April. If by that time supplies from the outside did not reach Bataan, General Wainwright, who had replaced General MacArthur in command, warned General Marshall by radio that the troops would "be starved into submission."

STRENUOUS efforts had been made since January to run food ships through the strong Japanese blockade. The results were tragically disappointing. The total food arriving at Bataan consisted of 5,000 tons of rice, 1,100 tons of balanced rations, and 400 animals for slaughter—a week's supply. By the end of February it was evident to the officers familiar with the blockade-running program that they could expect no more supplies from that source.

Unable to obtain food from outside Bataan, the quartermaster managed by heroic means to collect sustenance from local sources. Of rice, the most abundant food on Bataan, he gathered 250 tons, a 17-day supply. But Americans, unaccustomed to a steady diet of rice,

The end of the Battle of Bataan was followed by the Death March and three years of hell in prison camps





An exhausted dispatch rider fell asleep under arms

The one touch with the outside world was the short-wave broadcasts picked up by radio



found it an unsatisfactory substitute for bread and potatoes. Rice had little nutritive value. And without seasoning, it tasted like wallpaper paste. One man remarked, "Rice is the greatest food there is—anything you add to it improves it." But it had at least one virtue: it filled empty stomachs.

Fresh meat from the carabao, the Philippine beast of burden, was issued to the troops every third day so long as there were animals to slaughter. Without refrigeration on Bataan, the troops kept the carabao in enclosures until a meat issue was due. Additional food became available when the famed 26th Cavalry Regiment regrettably slaughtered its 250 horses and 48 mules.

For a short while the diet included fish caught by local fishermen who slipped out to sea at night. But Japanese gunfire and an occasional round from suspicious American beach outposts soon brought fishing activity to an end.

The individual soldier became a most ingenious scavenger, and on Bataan he found chickens, pigs, sweet potatoes, bamboo shoots, mangoes and bananas

to supplement his ration. Tormented by hunger, he could sometimes vary his diet with dog and monkey meat, with the chicken-like flesh of the iguana lizard relished by the natives, and with the meat of the large python snake whose eggs the Filipinos considered a great delicacy. "I can recommend mule," one officer wrote in his diary. "It is tasty, succulent, and tender—all being phrases of compunction, of course. There is little to choose between . . . pony and carabao. The pony is tougher but better flavor. Iguana is fair. Monkey I do not recommend. I never had snake." But another officer thought that monkey meat was all right "until the animal's hands turned up on the plate."

PILFERAGE, highjacking, and hoarding of supplies inevitably occurred. Trucks loaded with food and moving slowly along the narrow jungle trails were tempting targets both for hungry men with weapons and for unarmed starving civilians. Even guards posted along the roads were not all above temptation, and the closer the ration trucks came to the front lines the less food they usually contained. A driver was found to have accumulated a personal stock of more than 1,000 cans of food—mostly tomatoes, evaporated milk, and juice.

Not only individuals but units hoarded food. These generally established private dumps surrounded by barbed wire and under heavy guard. One unit collected 8,500 canned rations; another padded its strength reports and obtained 11,000 rations daily for almost half that number of men actually present. During one short period 122,000 rations were being issued daily to a total force far less.

Food was not the only thing the men on Bataan lacked. Coffee and tobacco were also scarce, but even more serious was the shortage of clothing and personal equipment. The ragged and threadbare uniforms offered little protection against the cruel thorns so abundant on Bataan. Fully one quarter of the men in one unit were without shoes; the rest wore shoes that were unfit for use. And many men lacked even blankets, shelter halves, and raincoats to protect them from the rain and the cold nights of mountainous Bataan.

The inevitable effect of exposure and the inadequate, unbalanced food ration was an alarming rise in diseases arising out of malnutrition and vitamin deficiency. Thin bodies and hollow cheeks were grim testimony to muscle waste and loss of fat reserve. Night blindness, swelling of joints, diarrhea, and dysentery were common; beri-beri in its incipient stages was almost universal. Among men who had lost the capacity to resist even the most minor ailments, any disease threatened to assume epidemic proportions.

WHEN the supply of quinine ran low, everyone's worst fears were confirmed. Malaria, which had been kept under control by prophylactic doses of quinine, spread with such rapidity that daily admissions to the hospitals soon numbered 750. By early April daily hospital admissions for malaria alone had reached the



The end came on 9 April 1942 when Maj. Gen. Edward P. King, flanked by Col. Everett C. Williams and Majors Wade Cothran and A. C. Tisdell, faced the Japanese

incredible figure of 1,000.

The medical facilities on Bataan were strained to the utmost. The two general hospitals, each designed for 1,000 patients, held twice their capacity. The medical clearing stations, converted into 300-bed hospitals, filled up quickly, as did the medical collecting companies, which had been transformed into 150-bed hospitals. And only the seriously sick could hope to gain admission.

The effect of starvation and disease upon combat efficiency was not surprising. The men of one regiment became so weak that they "were just able to fire a rifle out of the trench, and no more." A month after reaching Bataan, the military force was about 75 per cent combat effective; six weeks later, only 25 per cent. After three months of starvation diet, the ravages of disease, and incessant air and artillery bombardment from the enemy, the fighting capacity of the men was almost gone, their combat efficiency near zero.

One great hope fortified them. Somehow they would be rescued; somehow large reinforcements and ship-loads of food would break through the enemy blockade. They based their belief partly on their desperate desire for the sustenance of faith and partly on General MacArthur's assurance that help was on the way. "Thousands of troops and hundreds of planes," he had told them, "are being dispatched." But none came. And when President Roosevelt, in his 23 February fireside chat, placed the Philippines in their proper perspective "in the big picture of the war," many lost hope. "Plain for all to see was the handwriting on the wall . . .," an officer confided to his diary. "The President had—with regret—wiped us off the page and closed the book."

General MacArthur's departure to Australia in March made most of the American troops realize that the end was near. The Filipinos could hope to return to their homes. But not so the Americans. Death or capture was certain. They joked and talked hopefully about the future, but they knew the worst. They were the Battling Bastards of Bataan, "no mama, no papa, no Uncle Sam . . . and nobody gives a damn."

WHEN the Japanese began their final attack on 3 April, the American troops had already been defeated, by starvation and disease. They were incapable of the sustained physical effort necessary to fight off the enemy.

In five days the Japanese split and outflanked the American lines and gained undisputed passage to southern Bataan where the hospitals and their defenseless patients lay. Surrender or wholesale slaughter was the only choice open to General King, the commander on Bataan, and with a heavy heart he went forward on the morning of 9 April to arrange terms with the enemy.

The battle ended and the fighting over, the survivors of Bataan faced the horrors and atrocities of the Death March, the nightmare of three long years in a Japanese prison camp. But they remembered with justifiable pride the courage that had sustained them in a hopeless struggle.

They had much to be proud of, those Battling Bastards of Bataan. They had held off the Japanese for three months, and at the end they had been overwhelmed not by the enemy but by famine and sickness. The heroes of Bataan had suffered a medical, not a military, defeat.




Camera-carrying RP-71 drone leaves launching rack at 85mph



THE RCCCD

Bulova 77mm camera mounted in fuselage of drone

Drone camera photographs Camp Irwin, Calif., from 500 feet. The long shadows are cast by telephone poles



On the ground, controller maneuvers drone with "stick box." URW-3 transmitter in jeep sends the signals to drone

GETS THE PIX

RCCCD means "Radio controlled camera-carrying drone"—a method of obtaining combat aerial photographs developed by the Army Signal Corps at the Electronics Proving Ground, Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

The RP-71 drone is similar to the RCAT (radio controlled airplane target) used by the antiaircraft artillery (*see the May 1955 issue of this magazine*). With a wing span of only twelve feet, the drone can fly 228 miles an hour and climb 3,060 feet per minute. The take-off is jet-assisted. After launching, a gasoline motor drives a propeller. On signal by





the ground operator a parachute lowers the drone.

In tactical situations the drone can make either still photographs or motion pictures from a low altitude range of several hundred feet up to heights of more than four miles. Tactical commanders can be furnished with prints in less than an hour's time. The photograph at the bottom of this page was only one of forty-two exposures made during a single flight by the drone.

An obvious advantage of the ROCCD is that it doesn't require an air strip and can be launched from any area.

At altitude of 800 feet, drone mounted with
Bulova 70mm camera photographs
movements of tanks on floor of desert





Joshua started it before the walls of Gibeon

They Made the Sun Stand Still

LYNN MONTROSS

From Joshua at Gibeon to Morgan
at Cowpens and Ridgway in Korea
it has been leadership that
knew how to get the best out
of the men it had, that made the sun stand still

ARMS and munitions changed between Joshua's victory at Jericho and the operations of Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway in Korea. But without any noteworthy alterations in human nature. Man himself remains the basic unit of war, and Joshua's tactic of making the sun stand still has been successfully adapted by American generals all the way from Dan Morgan in 1781 to Matt Ridgway in 1951.

A good deal depends, of course, on one's interpretation of the poetic language of the Bible. The fall of Jericho brings to mind the familiar miracle of Joshua and his trumpet. Yet the Old Testament explains that the city was betrayed by a subversive who hid Joshua's spies within the walls. Before taking the trumpet version too literally, therefore, we might remember that we sometimes speak in symbols, too. When referring to an army's "collapse," we do not mean that whole ranks of soldiers fell flat on their faces like dominoes.

The capture of Jericho was followed by the destruction of Ai after Joshua lured the defenders outside the walls and into an ambush. These victories alarmed the five kings of the Amorites, who led their mighty host against the city of Gibeon, recently allied with Joshua. He came to the rescue in an all-night forced march from Gilgal, and the Old Testament records that he uttered this command: *Sun, stand thou still upon Gibeon; and thou, Moon, in the valley of Ajalon.*

The meaning of these words may very well have been pondered in 1781 by Dan Morgan. That Continental brigadier was in a worse pickle, if anything, than Joshua's strategic situation at Gibeon. The cam-

paign had begun when General Nathanael Greene divided his little American force, sending Morgan into northwest South Carolina while he maneuvered in the north-central area with the remainder of his force. His British opponent, Lord Cornwallis, reacted promptly by detaching Colonel Banastre Tarleton to pursue Morgan while he himself moved against Greene.

Morgan had never been up against a harder choice. If he fought Tarleton, now breathing hotly down the back of his neck, his scared militia recruits would throw away their muskets and run. And if he continued to retreat, they would desert until his force melted away. Morgan decided to fight.

There is no record that he consulted the Book of Joshua for a solution, but we do know that the 45-year-old frontiersman read his Bible diligently after repenting the sins of a brawling youth. And if he did refer to the Old Testament, he might have found this cryptic account of the victory won by Joshua after leading his people against the Amorite host:

And the sun stood still, and the moon stayed, until the people had avenged themselves upon their enemies.

That is as near as the Bible comes to revealing the

AND THESE AMERICAN BATTLE LEADERS CONTINUED IT



MORGAN at Cowpens



BROWN at Sackets Harbor



GREENE at Guilford Court House



JACKSON at New Orleans



RIDGWAY in Korea

tactics at Gibeon. Yet it is possible that this symbolic description may have given Dan Morgan an idea resulting in the tactical masterpiece of the Revolution and the most imitated battle of American history.

As a starting premise, Morgan may have reasoned that Joshua, too, probably led green militia recruits. Such men are not poltroons; they are undependable simply because they lack the training to prepare them for unknown perils. In the last war Morgan had seen Braddock's veteran redcoats flee from Indians in the forest, just as he had seen hard-bitten American frontiersmen flee from French regulars in formal combat. It took time to fit men to meet new dangers. And here it may have occurred to Morgan that the sun symbolized *time*; that if you could reduce the time of training from months to minutes, you were, in effect, making the sun stand still!

At any rate, he had only minutes in which to prepare the minds of his recruits for their ordeal. In round numbers he commanded about nine hundred men, a third of whom were battlewise Continentals. The remainder, comprising Georgia and South Carolina militia, had received little or no military instruction.

Tarleton did not hold a great advantage in numbers with 1,000 troops, but all were British regulars or Loyalist veterans. His establishment included two small cannon and some 250 dragoons. A reputation for frightfulness might also have been counted among his assets, for the stocky little Briton had made his name a legend of terror through the South.

MORGAN had no artillery, and half of his 80 dragoons were foot soldiers recently mounted on country nags. But contemporary accounts tell us that he went from one campfire to another on the eve of battle, stiffening the backbones of whey-faced border lads with outrageous flattery.

"Just think how your girls will hug you," he jollied them, "when you tell how you whipped the redcoats!"

Subtlety would have been wasted, for it was enough to be noticed by such a fabulous figure. In the last war Morgan had been given five hundred lashes on his bare back for knocking down a redcoat officer, and it tickled his robust sense of humor to recall that the British count fell one lash short. Commanding the Continental riflemen at Saratoga in 1777, he was able to discipline those turbulent characters with his own two ham-like fists. And even now, with his burly, six-foot frame crippled by rheumatism, Dan Morgan could put heart into young rustics when he bragged: "Watch me crack the whip over Ban Tarleton in the morning!"

Morgan at Cowpens

In the cold and misty dawn of 17 January 1781, Morgan's recruits could doubtless feel second-hand courage oozing out of them as they broke camp in the woods. Even his company officers were dismayed as he marched his force out to a fairly level clearing with the unfordable Broad River to the rear, cutting off retreat.

Known as the Cowpens because it had once pastured cattle, this area offered neither serious obstacles to the British dragoons nor protection to the American flanks. It was just the sort of ground that Tarleton would have chosen.

Morgan's officers must have recalled that Greene had enjoined him to take no unnecessary risks. The rebel cause was too shaky to bear up under many more reverses. What with Arnold's treason, Gates's defeat at Camden, and Washington's terrible winter at Morristown, this last year had indeed been a time to try men's souls.

Caution should have been the watchword, yet Dan Morgan's tactical plan violated every canon of an orthodox eighteenth century battle piece. Where it had been thought best to place American militiamen in the rear, in anticipation of their panic, he stationed his recruits in the front line. And where it had been the custom to forbid such novices to run, he gave them permission to withdraw after firing three shots.

About 150 yards behind the front line, the second line consisted of the dependable third of the army. These veterans were ordered to stand firm at all costs and to bear the brunt of British attack after the militia's flight. Morgan insisted, however, that the militiamen retreat in some order around the American left flank and behind a low ridge, where the 80 rebel dragoons were posted to cover the hurried withdrawal.

This ridge, to use a modern military term, was the "key terrain feature" of the field. Barely high enough to give protection from bullets, it extended across the entire American rear, about 150 yards behind the second line.

A PALE, watery sun was just groping out of the mist when the redcoats exploded out of the woods, some four hundred yards away, and into the clearing. Tarleton formed a single line of advance, with his infantry in the center and his dragoons divided between the wings. The two British cannon were dragged out in front to open the action. But to the astonishment of everyone, including themselves, Morgan's militiamen stood firm as the round shot ricocheted through their ranks, leaving behind them a few shrieking men with mangled limbs.

Tarleton was so sure of victory that he did not wait for further artillery "preparation." The militiamen nerved themselves as the scarlet line came on at a slow and stately parade step. No doubt the British grenadiers looked grotesquely tall in their brass plated caps, and the bayonets had a wicked gleam. Then the militia officers yelled commands, and the ragged volley blotted the enemy from sight with low-hanging clouds of dingy powder smoke.

This was usually the moment of panic for green troops. It took grit to go through the complex motions of reloading a flintlock—tamping down powder, ball and wad with an iron ramrod—when an unseen enemy might burst through the smoke at any instant. But the

worst ordeal can be borne if it has a limit, and most of the men fired three times before the line crumpled.

Their officers managed to keep some semblance of formation, moreover, as the column pounded rearward. The American dragoons rode out on the left to oppose any threat of enemy pursuit while Morgan and several sergeants waited to halt the militiamen behind the ridge. From the crest the recruits could glance back sheepishly through the clearing powder smoke and see that their three shots had stopped the redcoats. The British officers were dressing the thinned ranks for a resumption of the advance.

AS the militiamen huddled together, panting, Morgan doubtless made a few appropriate remarks; and it may be safely assumed that old sergeants had blistering tongues in 1781, even as today. The militiamen, in short, probably had their ears scorched as they were ordered to reload and form again into ranks while spent balls droned harmlessly overhead.

The battle now entered its critical phase, with Morgan's second line—only 277 infantry supported by the 80 dragoons—standing off Tarleton's whole force in a backwoods Thermopylae. It was fortunate for them that the redcoats did not employ their strength effectively, not to mention the usual shortcomings of British musketry. But on the whole the Continentals of the second line owed their survival to sheer, hard fighting. Once they wavered and almost broke, only to form again and beat off attacks from both front and flank. Meanwhile the American dragoons were tangling on the left with British horsemen.

During this struggle Dan Morgan was busily engaged behind the ridge at making the sun stand still over Cowpens. Riding up and down the militia column, he scolded, praised and cajoled—anything to prepare the minds of his homespun-clad rustics to give another effort. Above all, as the roar of musketry continued, he strove to convince them that the battle was already won.

"Follow me!" he shouted, and the 553 militiamen moved out around the ridge at a quick step.

The revolving door had not yet been invented, but no better simile could be found to describe the swing of the column all the way around the British left flank, thus completing nearly a full circuit of the field. Morgan's timing was perfect. The militiamen emerged just at the instant when the mere sight of reinforcements was enough to decide the issue.

A wholesale surrender of British regulars ensued after the American dragoons routed their mounted opponents and closed in on the enemy's other flank. Fewer than a hundred fugitives, including Tarleton himself, ever rejoined Cornwallis. They left behind some 300 killed and wounded, 600 prisoners, and all arms and baggage. In fifty minutes the small British army had been destroyed for military purposes by Americans whose losses were 12 killed and 60 wounded.

It was Dan Morgan's last fight. Overburdened as his

army was with prisoners and spoils, he barely managed to rejoin Greene just ahead of Cornwallis's hot pursuit. Then, too crippled by rheumatism to sit his horse, he retired to his home in Virginia.

Next came a campaign of marches and retreats through the North Carolina woods as Cornwallis tried to bring Greene to bay. The American general, a Quaker in his youth, clung to a cautious strategy of keeping intact the one rebel army in the South while guerrilla bands preyed upon British outposts and detachments. But he was much impressed by Morgan's demonstration of using undependable elements as a mobile reserve, and in March he made a stand in a clearing resembling the scene of Tarleton's disaster.

Greene At Guilford Court House

Recent reinforcements gave Greene an advantage in bulk over a British army of 2,400 men, but two thirds of his strength consisted of unreliable militia. He posted the greenest units in the front line with orders to fire three shots before withdrawing around a second line of more dependable recruits and a third line of Continentals.

As a departure from the original plan, however, Greene left an interval of about three hundred yards between his lines, or double the distance of Cowpens. This proved to be the fatal flaw. The military amateurs of the first line felt such a terrifying sense of isolation upon sighting the enemy that they threw away their arms and sprinted to the rear. Most of the deserters never stopped running until they reached their own dooryards.

It speaks well for Greene's dependable troops that they slugged it out to a finish. Cornwallis won the few trampled acres of the field, but Tarleton called the battle of Guilford Court House "the pledge of ultimate defeat." The British left their wounded behind and abandoned North Carolina to Greene.

HE used the Cowpens blueprint for victory again at Eutaw Springs, the last battle of the war. The action was fought in eastern South Carolina by the usual small armies. This time the militiamen of the first line gave Greene not three, but eight or ten, shots without flinching. It was the British regulars who folded, and the militiamen seemed to have won the decision almost unaided. Then the famished, half naked recruits broke ranks to plunder the camp vacated by the enemy, and during the ensuing disorder they were driven from the field by a counterattack. Even so, the redcoats limped back to Charleston, after losses of nearly 50 per cent, and never more troubled the interior of South Carolina.

Jacob Brown at Sackets Harbor

A generation later, despite painful object lessons, the young nation relied again upon unreliable militia volunteers in the War of 1812. Jacob Brown, the militia brigadier commanding the land forces at Sackets

Harbor, New York, was another former Quaker with a love of war. The absence of the American squadron gave the British their opening, and Sir George Prevost led an amphibious assault on the important American naval base at the eastern end of Lake Ontario.

The British squadron was sighted on an unseasonably hot day late in May 1813. Brown had some 500 regulars plus an equal number of militiamen to oppose the 850 redcoats who landed in longboats on wooded Horse Island, then waded through the shallows to the mainland.

In this emergency the American general dusted off the old Cowpens formula, hidden away in the attic of history for three decades. He posted his farmers and villagers behind a gravel bank on the shore with orders to fire a few rounds at the wading redcoats before withdrawing to the safety of the woods. Then the brunt of the defense was to be borne by the American regulars, drawn up in a second line on the parade ground in front of the warehouses and log barracks of the navy yard.

The militiamen, according to Prevost, put up "so heavy and galling a fire . . . as to render it impossible to halt for the artillery to come up." After routing these novices, the British met an even hotter reception on the parade ground. American cannon raked the scarlet lines with grape as Brown's regulars fired steady volleys. The British broke under this punishment and pulled back to reorganize.

Returning to the attack, they marched with a majestic tread to the music of fife and drum. Both sides resumed firing without giving an inch. It was nip and tuck when a nervous American naval officer decided prematurely to burn the navy yard. The result was one of the most dramatic spectacles of the war: the American regulars standing their ground with the British fire in their faces and the flames of the blazing warehouses at their backs.

BROWN knew better than to try to shame the militiamen taking refuge in the woods. He ordered a few dragoons to gallop past them, shouting "Victory! Victory!" Thus he managed to lure them back into a fight they believed to be safely won.

The fresh militiamen hit the British flank just as the British themselves were attempting a flank attack, and the surprise was decisive. Prevost's troops withdrew in disorder and waded to their longboats on Horse Island. No pursuit was attempted by Brown, who did not intend to expose the fortitude of his armed rustics to further tests.

It remained for another militia leader to see that the pattern battle had broader possibilities than those shown in the first four demonstrations. Andrew Jackson's boyhood home had been located within hearing of the cannon at Cowpens. His neighbors took part with the militia, and a few months later he himself was made prisoner by the British as a thirteen-year-old militiaman. Thus at New Orleans, thirty-three years

later, no one was better qualified than Jackson to know the alarms of untried Americans up against British regulars who had beaten Napoleon's marshals in Spain.

Jackson at New Orleans

Jackson's army of 5,700 men included 700 regulars and marines plus such oddly scrambled elements as frontier militia, Gulf pirates, Creole planters, and even armed citizens and slaves. A third of this force had not arrived when the vanguard of the 14,000 invaders took a secret route which brought them within a few miles of the city.

The date of the battle of New Orleans, as any reference work will attest, was 8 January 1815. But this was merely the climax of a two-week series of fights as Old Hickory made the sun stand still. Instead of adopting the tactics of Cowpens, he raised the basic idea to the level of planning and strategy. And just as Morgan put a safe limit on the effort expected of green recruits, Jackson gradually instilled confidence into his men without exposing them beyond their tactical depth.

On the theory that all cats are gray in the dark, he surprised the redcoats with a night attack on 23 December 1814, before the vanguard had time to rest and consolidate. As he had anticipated, his Kentucky riflemen more than held their own in the darkness with confused British regulars.

THIS was but the opening round as Jackson continued to build up a winning morale while avoiding serious risks. His frontiersmen raided British outposts by night and harassed the enemy with long-range rifle fire by day. When the redcoats attempted a reconnaissance in force, they were repulsed. And in an artillery duel on the first day of the new year, the Americans got the better of the exchange.

During these preliminaries Jackson threw up earthworks on both sides of the Mississippi south of the city. He planned to fall back from one prepared position to another if necessary, but in twenty minutes on 8 January his entrenched riflemen won a great victory by killing or wounding more than 2,000 of the invaders as they advanced in close order. At a cost of 13 American casualties, it remains to this day probably the most one-sided defeat ever inflicted on British arms in fair fight. It was once that Britannia did not win the last one.

A grateful nation rewarded Jackson with its highest office for demonstrating that the Cowpens formula could be enlarged. Nor was its usefulness confined to the age of flintlocks, since human nature does not change along with weapons. Later instances might perhaps be found in the Civil War or the two World Wars, but it would be hard to beat a still more modern example: General Ridgway's operations in Korea during the first half of 1951.

Here we leap from history to battles fresh in the memory of thousands of American participants. These Americans, incredible as it still seems, were the military

underdogs in a fight with a fanatical peasant army.

In 1945, at the peak of our armed might, such a strategic nightmare could not have been imagined. But our return to a peace footing was so complete that six years later we were being pushed around by the forces of Red China.

This was the situation during the last days of 1950 when General Ridgway reached Korea to command Eighth Army after the death of Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker in a jeep accident. Eighth Army had recently been pushed all the way back from the Yalu to the Imjin when its "end the war" offensive collided late in November with the first Chinese counterstroke.

When Ridgway arrived, the enemy was massing 450,000 troops for a new all-out effort. The blow fell in the bitter cold of New Year's Eve. Again Eighth Army went into reverse, selling Korean real estate dearly to some of the toughest opponents Americans ever have faced. Possessing but a fraction of our fire power, the Chinese made up for the lack with tactics of infiltration and night fighting learned in long years of guerrilla warfare against the Japanese and the Chinese Nationalists.

Matt Ridgway in Korea

Seoul and Inchon were evacuated as the UN forces continued to fall back during the first week of January. These new losses of ground meant that the front had receded about two hundred miles since Thanksgiving. Never before in history had a U.S. army retreated so far in so short a time. And though morale held up surprisingly well on the whole, some outfits showed symptoms of a psychological ailment which the soldiers themselves diagnosed as "bugout fever."

In extenuation, it must be remembered that Eighth Army was made up originally of occupation troops. Under-strength units were pieced out with hastily trained South Koreans speaking no English. There had been precious little band music or flag-waving as these divisions were hustled off to an alien land of sullen mountains and stinking rice paddies. And soon the supposed "police action" turned out to be the fourth largest military effort of our history, though never officially dignified with the name of a war.

FEW American generals have ever had as tough a command problem as the one inherited by Ridgway. There is no evidence that he sought a precept in the battles of Cowpens or New Orleans, but his solution would doubtless have been approved by Dan Morgan and Old Hickory. Just as they hardened their men by exposing them at first only to limited risks, so Ridgway ordered a reconnaissance in force as soon as the Chinese attacks ended. It merely confirmed the fact, already pretty well established by air observation, that the enemy had evacuated Osan. More to the point, it meant that Americans were advancing again for the first time in two months.

Only an RCT was involved. Five days later, on 22

January 1951, a two-regiment task force pushed far enough ahead to have a few little fire fights. On the 25th Ridgway launched an advance by two divisions. And by 5 February he was carrying out an offensive by two corps on a seventy-mile front.

Matt Ridgway's strategy in Korea was strong and simple: "Use every daylight hour," he told his division commanders, "to seek out and destroy the enemy. Inflict maximum casualties and sustain a minimum of your own."

If this seems a cold-blooded tenet of a professional warrior, it may be recalled that Abraham Lincoln held the same view in 1862. He foresaw that the Union could be preserved only by destroying the armies of the Confederacy, not by occupying its territory. And the war dragged on until he found in Grant a general who understood.

Nor was Ridgway the one to insist that every inch of soil be defended to the death. He put it succinctly: "Real estate is, here, incidental."

The time was coming when Eighth Army soldiers could utter such frayed phrases as "strategic withdrawal" without the usual sardonic grimace. When the enemy counterattacked in February, Ridgway's "elastic defense" was not merely a euphemism for taking a licking. He rolled with the punches and gave more punishment than he received.

This strategy made sense to the men on the firing line. It is not necessary that a general be popular, but he must have the confidence of the rank and file. And while Ridgway was never dubbed "the GI's general" by reporters, he won trust and respect as a professional who knew his business.

Operation Killer

His task of welding the polyglot Eighth Army into a coherent whole was complicated by the fact that it included troops of fourteen nationalities. Allowances had to be made for the traditions and prejudices of Britons, Frenchmen, Turks, Thai, Filipinos, and other UN contingents. Yet it was an integrated striking force of 250,000 troops which jumped off all along the front on 21 February in Operation KILLER.

G2 reports had warned that an estimated 750,000 Chinese were preparing for a third great offensive. Ridgway's aim was to keep the enemy off balance while inflicting casualties. After Operation KILLER accomplished its purposes, he began a new drive in March without losing momentum. And though gaining ground was secondary, Operation RIPPER took the advancing Eighth Army past Seoul and the 38th parallel.

WHEN at last the long-expected enemy offensive struck on 22 April, Ridgway did not demand last-ditch stands. He preferred to cushion the shock by pulling back to long-prepared positions where the utmost hurt could be done to attackers. The Chinese offensive ground to a halt in a week after losses conservatively estimated at 70,000 killed and wounded.

Ridgway had just relieved General MacArthur as Supreme Commander, and Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet succeeded to the command of Eighth Army. On 16 May the enemy tried again, only to be caught off balance in dangerously overextended positions by Eighth Army's counterstroke.

MORE Chinese prisoners were taken in ten days than during the entire war so far. Where the enemy had once boasted of his fanaticism, remnants of whole units surrendered to swell a bag of 10,000 captives. Meanwhile, the numbers of enemy killed would have been appalling to a free nation respecting the lives and liberties of its citizens.

No one, from Matt Ridgway down to the newest PFC, believed that the Communists were beaten as yet. But they were staggering as Eighth Army rained blows while slugging its way forward against a desperate defensive. It was then that the enemy resorted to an old Communist dodge. When in distress, Chinese military writings counselled, a much-needed breathing spell could sometimes be gained at the expense of an unwary foe by calling a pretended peace conference.

This is the significance of the plea for peace talks made by Jacob A. Malik, then foreign minister of the Soviet Union, on 23 June 1951. Two days later the proposal was unofficially endorsed in a radio broadcast by the Chinese Communist government, and UN officials indicated their willingness to discuss terms. Finally, it was agreed that representatives of both sides would meet at Kaesong early in July.

The Communist purpose in insisting that the talks be held behind their own lines was soon revealed. United Nations delegates were subjected to petty insults and humiliations to make them appear losers begging for terms. Peace was far from the thoughts of Chinese Reds who contrived delays and evasions to gain time for reorganizing their battered army.

THE victory of trickery at Kaesong won the enemy a comparative lull in the fighting until the end of August. During this respite he brought up artillery while constructing a vast system of defenses in depth. There were no flanks to be turned in a mountainous peninsula, leaving Eighth Army only the dubious prospect of frontal attacks against an entrenched foe with a new equality in artillery. A breakthrough or an amphibious landing could have been mounted only at a prohibitive cost in casualties.

Kaesong thus became the turning point of a conflict which settled into a stalemate reminiscent of the Western Front during the remaining twenty three months down to the cease-fire of 27 July 1953. But this outcome cannot dim the achievement of the man who redeemed the pride of Eighth Army and transformed it into one of the great military instruments of American history. Never, in fact, since the time of Joshua has there been a better job of making the sun stand still than Matt Ridgway accomplished in Korea.

THE NATURE OF COMMAND

(Continued from page 21)

(which raises the question of whether we can afford it).

Which way we will go is not certain. Public opinion will decide. The view may be growing that we need to develop a new class of commanding officers and those who share their duties of command—that is to say, staffs. Their duty would be the direction of military endeavor as a single effort. They would owe allegiance only to the President and his delegate, the Secretary of Defense, and not to any component service.

THE services' principal objection to this—all three probably would raise it—is that only a lifelong airman is qualified to direct air operations; substitute sea and ground references to suit the source. But Hickam deemed this fallacious in the 1925 state of American enterprise. Our national and military growths mean while have multiplied by many times his conception of the new type of man, the commander of general ability directing technical specialists. Logically, ability and training are the only requisites. All men start as specialists. By the time they are expertly trained in one field (be it infantry, fighter aircraft or submarines), if they also have substantial ability they are capable of learning much of other specialties, and of judging accurately how much responsibility to delegate to subordinate specialists. It is certainly possible, and possibly vital, that we use such ability to its fullest scope.

SINCE the armed forces cannot agree on a single-command philosophy for joint operations, the public, concerned over perpetual disunity in top command, has undertaken to remedy the deficiency by clarifying the exclusive command power of the Secretary of Defense and service secretaries. Thought is being given to a single command-staff system at many or all levels, whose members would have no ties with any component service. The logic of this, and the strategic economy it envisages, are sufficiently impressive to warrant preparatory measures by the services.

Since the preceding paragraph discusses a trend, not a certainty, it would be well that any steps that may be taken have secondary objectives of appreciable value. Such is the recommendation stated below. It would foster improved interservice understanding, and benefit future application of the old principles of mutual cooperation or unified command.

The proposal is that the staffs of all the armed forces, beginning with the respective departmental headquarters themselves and extending down through the division or comparable level, be made joint staffs. This would be true at all times, regardless of the composition of the forces commanded. Service representation would not need to be equal. It should suffice that one third of the positions be filled from the other two services combined.

CEREBRATIONS

Misinterpretation—as Certain As Death or Taxes

REAMS of paper have been written and hours of study have been devoted to reducing or eliminating red tape. But I wonder how much thought has been given to the amount of red tape which results from poorly written regulations and directives?

Consider this: Current regulations state that military personnel ordered to overseas areas to which dependents are authorized travel must request coordinated travel for their dependents and may not leave their current stations until the request is either granted or denied by the overseas commander. Only after an answer is received may the dependents be moved, either to a port or to a home of choice, as the case may be. An enlisted man of my unit, ordered to an overseas area, did not desire to take his dependents with him. The regulation, while not explicitly so stating, was, due at least partially to the manner in which it was written, so interpreted as to bar this soldier from shipping his household effects anywhere unless he first requested and was either granted or denied coordinated travel. The overseas commander did not authorize coordinated travel, but did authorize the travel of the dependents to the area a few days after the sponsor. As a result of the delay and particularly since there was still doubt as to whether, in the circumstances, he could ship his household effects to a home of choice, the soldier took his dependents overseas.

The net result of this snafu, aside from the inconvenience and expense to the individual, was a considerable additional cost to the Government as well as unnecessary correspondence (Exercise Paper Chase) and many hours of conferences and deliberations. The dependents and belongings could have been shipped to the place where they wanted to stay while the soldier was overseas for a few hundred dollars. The cost of the overseas move was in the thousands. Finally, in the morale field, both the soldier and his family are dissatisfied; one family will be overseas against their desire and some

other family which wants to be overseas may be denied the opportunity.

I am reasonably certain that the Department of the Army did not intend to force dependents to go overseas against their will by depriving them of the right to move elsewhere in the States at Government expense. Yet that is exactly what happened in this case.

Those who write and review regulations should remember that the people who are guided by them are neither mind readers nor mental geniuses. If a directive is at all susceptible of misinterpretation, it will be. You can rely on that. The only solution is the good old rule of military correspondence, unfortunately largely forgotten in these days: clarity, brevity, coherence. A little more careful preparation and editing of regulations and other directives will save paper, time and money, as well as, in many cases, annoyance and unhappiness.

COL. STILSON H. SMITH

Mobility Is Men

SOME soldiers speak as if mobility were the special property of machines and men who operate and direct them.

This idea should be laid to rest. Mobility, and the mental state that exploits it, is a heritage of all the Army. It belongs to those who will use it.

Consider these exponents of mobile warfare: Jackson, Sheridan, and Rommel.

Jackson was an artillerist, professor, and infantry brigadier for sixteen years before he took command of the forces in the Shenandoah Valley.

Sheridan served only with infantry until two months before he led a revitalized Union cavalry to victory over Jeb Stuart at Yellow Tavern.

And Rommel's background was entirely infantry until he took command of the 7th Panzer Division, three months before he crossed the Meuse in May 1940.

The point is clear: Flexibility, daring, mobility of mind, and speed of decision—are attributes of *men*, not machines.

MAJOR JOHN H. CUSHMAN

Bound by Honor, or Paper?

MUST we have an officer's signature on a certificate before we can accept his veracity or honesty? I ask because it seems that almost every day aspersions are made on an officer's honor by the unreasonable number of certificates required of him in carrying out even a routine job. Times were when an officer's word was his bond, but nowadays . . . skepticism and disillusionment result. Let's look at some examples.

In Korea, during combat, officers in certain units had to certify that their men would not contract trench foot *in the future!* During the spring of 1954, some units had picked up equipment they needed for the men's comfort. There was a shortage of water trailers, generators, hand tools and other items. Certificates were required, as of a specific date, to the effect that no unauthorized property was on hand. Yet no one provided the needed items. Many unit commanders refused to sign such certificates, or if they did, modified them to read "except for that needed for the welfare of this unit." In one division it was SOP to write, "I certify that the above items when drawn, plus those on hand, will not exceed the authorized allowance of this unit," even though the officer had signed the requisition. In Korea, some company commanders certified that they had only two dogs, then prayed that no strays wandered into the area at the wrong time.

The MCM states that to support a charge a statement of expected testimony must be furnished, when possible. Some officers have had to *swear* to the statements, though a signature is just as binding.

A staff officer phones for information. He gets it and then says, "OK, put that in writing so I'll have a record." An officer can't get license plates by telling the provost marshal's clerk he carries car insurance; he must produce the policy. If he wants to buy at the commissary, he must get a card from the AG. He goes to the commis-

sary, in uniform, but he must sign in and have his signature compared with that on his card. His statement that he is authorized to deal there is not enough.

It's a slap in the face to get a membership card for an officers' mess that reads: "This is to certify that the officer whose signature appears on the face of this certificate is a member"—only to see the secretary-treasurer's name affixed by a rubber stamp.

It is probably in matters connected with personal finances that most officers have the feeling they are not trusted. To cash a check in an officers' club, you must be a member. Evidently the fact that you are an officer is no proof of your honesty. Yet an officer's checks are accepted in payment for bills.

The number of examples is countless.

Is the demand for so many certificates caused by busy commanders who "inspect" from their offices? Or is it the feeling of security such documents give? With his junior's statement on file, he feels covered. If he is caught in error, he can prove his subordinate submitted a false statement. Pressure tempts some officers into signing hurriedly when there should have been a closer reading. The knowledge that there are people so careless breeds mistrust and the desire for proof on paper.

The Army officer's code is built around an honor system that begins in cadet days. It needs to be. The system is right—only a few in the system are wrong. A member of the officer corps should be considered an officer and a gentleman—bound by honor, not by paper. Those whose honesty must be attested to have no place in the system.

Lt. FRANK C. BENEDICT

Need a Lift? Salute!

PRACTICE in saluting does not make perfect. The more we soldiers salute, the less it looks like it's supposed to. The ability to perform this military gesture markedly deteriorates with rank, precision becoming the sole pride of the recruit.

Saluting sloppiness is the vogue with the veteran—particularly with the officer and, more commonly, with the senior officer. The adoption of some freak and usually weary gesture, in response to a recruit's precise acknowledgment of parade-ground quality, is supposedly the mark of the fine old

campaigner. It's really a sign of low-order indifference, high-order snobbery, or an unforgivable perversion of our time-honored and tradition-tinted military symbol of greeting.

Not all enlisted men are faultless. The new crop has a tendency to bring its hand up, at right angle to the forehead, carefully above the eyebrow, in a delicate peekaboo. These men don't salute; they satisfy their curiosity. Some soldiers, fed up with the regal and shoddy saluting of officers, react with their own saluting ambiguities. Usually, though, the soldier, with the admirable charity of his profession, patiently indulges the peculiarities of his seniors.

Perhaps you have heard the story of the soldier in Korea who saluted with such forcefulness that his index finger hit the rounded, dull-knife edge of his helmet, and slivered off a piece of flesh which flicked into the eye of the object of his snappy greeting. The report is that the soldier was almost tried for self-inflicted wound (after all, it was his trigger finger), and there was a technical question of assault and battery. He had laid his hand, or a portion of it, on an officer in such a lightning manner as to be literally blinding in effect.

It is understood that safety officers investigating and reviewing the incident suggested that we adopt the salute of our British cousins in order to prevent repetition of this affair. Luckily, the suggestion was vetoed. The British salute with the palm turned forward, the hand never touching the head or headgear. It moves up fiercely and stops with a tuning-fork quiver. The entire bended arm takes on the nervous shakes. One cannot view this fitful display without sympathy. It's not a greeting; it's a calisthenic.

Even an unastute observer has seen innumerable instances where the alert and neat salute of the young soldier was returned by a weary, wavering response of half-cupped fist. Or a *bon voyage* bid, a football stiff-arm, a reversion to the Nazi thrust, a Papal blessing, a flicking of sweat from the brow, a rubbing of sleep from the eye—every conceivable acrobatic except the beautiful simplicity of the prescribed amenity.

Some offending officers develop the hesitation pitch. They consider it unseemly to salute a junior first. With furtive look they often mistake a natural, forward swing of an arm for a

deliberate move. Part way up they stop, jerk, then make an alternate ego-redeeming bungle, to tighten belt buckle, adjust tie, or relieve an imaginary itch. Thus feinted out of position, the correct salute is proffered and the gyration to make a recovery makes them react as though a lance had been stuck into their pants.

It's not that most of us don't know how to salute. Only rheumatism, amputation of the starboard side, or a sling-carrying cast-stiffened fracture would prevent us from saluting properly. In most cases it is the saluted, not the saluter, who makes the horrendous improvisations.

Many officers have two types of salute, as they may have two voices: one for wife, another for secretary or company clerk. The salute they give in response to a subordinate's is of the feeble, perfunctory, wobbly variety. But the one they render to the officer who rates their efficiency report is a model of perfection.

How can we achieve the pleasant universality of greeting which, aside from regulation's directing, sociability prescribes?

History records that our first commander in chief rose in wrath against subalterns who could not master the operation of presenting their fuses. He required them to salute at ceremonies by lifting their hats. By virtue of this hallowed precedent, we might do the same thing. Penalize offenders by depriving them of the hand-salute privilege. Allow them only the gesture of lifting their lids. But were this decreed, we might develop a herd of hat-doffing deviationists.

Here's a suggestion. (Of course, neither *you* nor *I* breach the etiquette of the hand salute.) Next time we are confronted by a sharp young soldier or noncom, we could beat him to the draw. Look him squarely in the eye as we whip a salute with the snap and zest of a good right cross and the perfection demanded by paragraph 22 of FM 22-5.

Leaping lightning, the sixth sense of mutuality, will zip across the gap from uniform to uniform. Camaraderie and *élan* are contagious. The salute is the medium for pitching them about. There's a reason for labeling the salute "a highball." Put out in the right manner, there is something intoxicating about it.

Need a lift? Salute!

MAJOR JOHN E. MURRAY

Better

Efficiency Reports

THE Comments that follow were inspired by "How Do You Get Promoted?" in the September issue, an article that contained some fairly definite implications concerning certain weaknesses of the efficiency report.

It is my sincere opinion that much of the present handling of efficiency reports and derivation from them of an overall efficiency index for weighing an individual officer is a doubtful use of statistical method. This method is reasonably correct when applied to a reasonably large number of separate scores, but it is definitely of questionable validity when applied to a very small number of reports.

Fundamentally, the defect is that, for the typical officer, the frequency of efficiency reports is far too low. This means that under conditions of mobilization and sometimes at other periods, we find ourselves forced to select officers for training, promotion, retention, and so on, on the basis of only a very few complete reports. Yet, in the determination of an OEI the statistician applies the same mechanics that he does to the man with a stack of records.

Coupled with this fundamental flaw, are two characteristics only slightly less important in their bad effects. First is the complication of the present report. The demand the present form makes for balanced comment among several groups of ratings constitutes an excessive requirement on the personal effort of a rating officer. Second is the frequent delay of several months between the date of the report and the date a copy reaches the career management group concerned. There may be a lot of decisions made concerning an officer during a period that long.

Criticism such as this is worthless unless it can be accompanied by suggestions of practical use. So here goes:

It seems that there are only four general questions about an officer that any commander is interested in up to the time he chooses between two individual personalities: (1) How is he as a commander—to stand on his own feet, make and carry out decisions? (2) How is he as a staff officer? (3) How is he as a technician—as an engineer, pier officer, motor-pool operator, office manager, and so on? (4) What is his availability for promotion?

Suppose we make the efficiency report form a single sheet with all the

brief instructions on the back, and on the front, following the name, and basic data of the rated officer, the following five sections.

Section I contains four words, *commander, staff officer, technician, promotion*, each followed by a graphic scale. The scale following *commander* contains 40 spaces, the others 20 each so that the total possible score is 100. Each of the first three scales is marked by comparing the officer with all *recently* observed officers of like experience. The midpoint on each scale is the man whom you would make no strenuous efforts to get if you did not have him, or get rid of if you had him. The midpoint on the fourth scale—*promotion*—is the man who is just qualified for his present grade; above that measures relative desirability for promotion; below that measures possibility of reclassification.

Section II contains the word description of the rated officer by the rater, and the latter's signature and identification.

Section III is similar to Section I, but is for completion by the indorsing officer, and contains two additional alternate answers: *No entry because I have observed the rated officer less than 30 days, and I have submitted a separate letter explaining why I am unable to rate this officer.* The indorsing officer completes the scales or selects one of the two remarks and crosses out the alternate not used.

Section IV is a description of the rated officer and his performance by the indorser, with his signature and identification.

Section V contains the statement *I have read this efficiency report*, followed by space for date and signature of the rated officer.

The back of the form contains all the instructions for completing and forwarding the report.

The form would be in triplicate, preferably three colors, manifolded for carbons. After checking for completion of entries at local headquarters of record, the original would be sent directly to TAG, the first carbon to major command, and the second carbon to Career Management. Corrected copies, if needed, would be similarly distributed. The form would be completed quarterly as of the first of January, April, July and October, on all officers present for duty at least thirty days. This has these advantages:

It provides a reasonably large num-

ber of comments on each officer—a number large enough to be a legitimate basis for statistical analysis of the individual. (The present system permits statistically correct analysis of Army officers as a group, but provides only a presumptive basis for any analysis of the officer as an individual.) It also averages out the scores and comments made in consecutive reports by a single rater or indorser, thereby reducing the effect of isolated incidents on reports made while the incidents are fresh in the memory.

It is simple and easily understood, with no need to consult a separate instruction pamphlet, which may or may not be at hand when needed.

Everyone concerned knows what score is being awarded. (Incidentally, this secrecy in scoring efficiency reports is the only case where I have heard anyone make the assertion, seriously, that a man does a better job if he does not know what he is doing—that is, that the rater makes a truer rating if he does not know how it is scored.)

It tends to prevent indorsers avoiding the task of making a balanced rating by claiming not to know the man.

It gives the rated officer information about his rating while he can do something about it.

Against these advantages, there are certain disadvantages. First, this is a substantial change, and lots of people do not like change. This report does not answer some questions that many would like answered, but here the balance lies between having a current answer to a few fundamental questions rather than partial and delayed answers to a great number of questions. The frequency of the report may be questioned, but here I believe the critic will be confusing volume of paper with volume of paperwork. This form greatly decreases the amount of work of all involved.

Finally, there is the matter of the rated officer knowing his rating before it goes to TAG. At present, by the time an officer or his representative sees his record in Washington, any changes in the reports on which it is based are definitely blocked.

In summary, I suggest a system producing a much more simple but frequent efficiency report and a method that is more equitable to the rated officer and more useful and convenient to his superiors.

BRIG. GEN. H. T. MILLER

THE MONTH'S READING

Needed: a Two-Eyed Look at Western Defense

THE LONDON OBSERVER
"Deterrence"

Sunday, 16 October 1955

WHILE the people of the West are basking in the relaxing climate of the international *détente*, the men responsible for their defence show a growing anxiety. Within the last week, we have been told by General Gruenther that NATO is being too drastically denuded of troops; by General Twining that Soviet air power is outpacing that of the United States; and by Field-Marshal Montgomery that most of Western defence planning is seriously out of date.

Some of these anxieties plainly have political causes, such as France's North African troubles or the growing popular pressure in all Western countries to reduce the burden of defence in the belief that all danger of war is past. But one source of confusion may be found in the one-eyed doctrine of defence that has become widely fashionable—the reliance on deterrence by the threat of "massive retaliation" as the universal answer to all forms of aggression in the future.

Few would deny that the West's possession of the hydrogen bomb, and of the means for delivering it with devastating effect, has been and remains the ultimate guarantee against any Russian attack on decisive strategic areas—those areas, that is, which the Western Powers would be bound to consider sufficiently vital to be worth the risk of total war. But many doubt whether this ultimate deterrent is the appropriate answer to any and every local threat on the periphery of the Western position.

WE know, after all, that Russia possesses the same nuclear weapons; to-day she is in a position to deliver them on London or Paris, and in a few years' time she will be able to drop them on New York or Chicago. Some American experts believe that her progress in developing intercontinental guided missiles is at least as rapid as that of the United States. Once the strategic deterrent has become fully mutual, how can it be an effective safeguard against relatively minor local aggression? Could a British or American statesman order the dropping of hydrogen bombs on Moscow or Peking because, say, Persia or Burma were aggressed, if he knew that by his action he would invite the destruction of London or Washington?

Already talk of "massive retaliation" is leading some of

our smaller allies to question the value of building strong local defences, or may be pressing them into neutrality. Tomorrow, mutual deterrence by nuclear threat may present Russia with a new opportunity to nibble at the periphery of the West with impunity.

THE urgent need, then, is to encourage the building up of appropriate local defences in free Europe, the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent and in South-East Asia and the countries of the Pacific Ocean, so that Russia and China will not be tempted by a combination of nuclear stalemate and a local power vacuum to renew their pressure on weaker neighbours. Now, with the limits imposed on the defence effort of free countries by rising costs and manpower problems, adequate defence of these wide areas can be achieved only if we are prepared to sanction a wider use of atomic weapons in a tactical, defensive role.

For these reasons, and from strong moral considerations as well, an influential body of opinion on both sides of the Atlantic has lately come to favour the concept of "graduated deterrence." There are variations of the idea, but the essential common principle is that a severe distinction should be established between the tactical and strategic use of nuclear weapons; that is, between using them to kill attacking soldiers and using them to cripple generations of civilians. In a given situation the West should have the possibility to declare that it would use atomic weapons only against enemy forces and their supply lines within the battle zone, and would use them for that purpose ruthlessly and immediately but would not be the first to use them against cities and non-military targets.

AT present, there is a taboo in the West on the use of any weapon that relies on nuclear reaction, so that few people appreciate the difference between a tactical atom bomb (as small as the equivalent of 3,000 tons of T.N.T.) which can hit a precise target, and a hydrogen bomb (equivalent to 15 million tons of T.N.T.) with a fall-out area of 200 square miles. The horror of the latter tends to frighten Governments from authorising the necessary use of the former, because of the popular fear that the first atom bomb dropped on a strategic bridge would lead inevitably to the end of civilisation. A strict separation of the conditions for the use of the two types of weapons, publicly announced, would greatly increase the flexibility of Western defence planning.

There remains the decisive question of just where the line should be drawn. The boldest advocates of "graduated deterrence" would renounce the initiative in the "strategic" use of nuclear bombs altogether, calling for a solemn declaration that in no case will the West drop H-bombs on cities unless the enemy does so first. Against the great moral attraction of this view, it has been objected that the major deterrent may remain indispensable to prevent surprise occupation of really vital strategic areas, such as, for instance, the Ruhr: the line, it is argued, should be drawn between a local war, which could be fought with "tactical" deterrents, and an all-out war for world supremacy, which would at once invite the ultimate horror. The discussion needs pursuing. What is important is that a clear decision should be reached if the concept of Western defence is to be adapted to the realities of the coming age of nuclear stalemate.

Biography Doesn't Tell the Whole Story

ALLAN NEVINS
"Is History Made by Heroes?"
The Saturday Review
5 November 1955

BIOGRAPHY is one of the keys of history but only one, and excessive dependence on it easily distorts history. Social and economic forces are similarly a key, but only one; excessive dependence on them leads down the road of historical determinism, and would make man a mere automaton. The molding elements of history include ideas, forces, great men—and chance. A monistic picture of the past which exaggerates the role of any of these four is as unsatisfactory as an Egyptian painting without perspective. We have many reasons for reading good biography; but let us never forget that 200 black cats do not make one black horse—that a complete understanding of the multiple elements of the past cannot be gained from single lives. When Douglas Freeman had finished his "Lee" he was so impressed by the injustice his story had done the great array of subordinate officers that his conscience gave him no rest till he had published "Lee's Lieutenants"; and even that fell short of presenting the whole picture. A well-written biography is like a sonata finely played; but a well-planned history is like a great symphony, blending many themes, ideas, and insight into one tremendous whole.

More Air for the Army

JOHN G. NORRIS
The Washington Post & Times Herald
7 November 1955

TODAY, under an agreement made in 1952, the Army may operate only helicopters and fixed wing airplanes weighing under 5000 pounds. They may be used only for such missions as artillery spotting, wire laying, courier duty, evacuation of wounded, and transport within the immediate combat zone.

* * *

The Army believes its future ability to fight on an atomic

battlefield literally lies in the development of lighter and more mobile armor, and more and improved airlift. They want helicopters, fixed wing aircraft like the C-123, and still experimental vertical rising, forward moving "convertiplanes."

Because of this, these steps are going forward.

- The Army fixed wing pilot training program is being increased from an output of 750 to 1200 pilots annually, and the present 300-pilot turnout of 'copter pilots nearly doubled. Army fliers would like their own schools instead of relying on the Air Force.
- A centralized aviation division has been organized within the Army General Staff, under a flying officer, Maj. Gen. Hamilton H. Howze. He has launched an over-all study of Army aviation needs which will map the future of the fledgling air arm.
- The study is expected to lead to more consolidated control of Army aviation, the responsibility for which now is divided among seven different Army branches.
- A four-fold expansion in the number of Army large 'copter companies is planned.

Army leaders view the big troop carrying rotor planes as the "cavalry" of the future. . . . Today so-called cavalry—armor—has become so heavy and dependent on fuel supplies and favorable terrain that it has lost the speed and daring of true cavalry. . . .

What may be the forerunner of such a force will be tested in the big Sagebrush maneuvers. An experimental Army company of "SkyCav" has been organized, consisting of helicopters, fixed-wing planes, jeeps and tanks, and employing airborne and ground TV, radio, radar and photography.

Additionally, to increase both its tactical and strategic mobility, the Army is straining to reduce the weight and size of its new weapons and equipment so they can be carried by air. The recently unveiled T 101, 90mm self-propelled antitank gun on tracks is a good example. Made partly of aluminum, it weighs only 15,800 pounds, including some ammunition, and can be dropped by parachute.

Army officials would like to get more and better and bigger transports sooner to carry such equipment over both long and short distances. . . . They are convinced that if the Army had control of and flew all its own aircraft, like the Navy and Marine Corps, they'd get the airlift desired sooner.

Naturally this view meets strong resistance in the Air Force and among many Pentagon civilian officers. For one thing, it would duplicate overhead in operational procurement, training and administrative fields and cost more money. Opponents say it would make unification, "triplication."

Top Army officials do not go along with their air partisans in backing what might be a new "Army Air Corps," but they do want more Air Force emphasis on new big transports, and more of and greater Army control over "battlefield aircraft."

"We're not interested in getting airplanes that fly faster and higher like the Air Force," said one ranking officer. "What we want is something that goes slower and lower."

NATO's Strategy and NATO's Troubles

DAVID MANKER

THE emotional binge in which most of the world participated after the Geneva summit meeting was a natural reaction to many years of cold war. When the Russians showed that they can be approachable and human when they want to be and that the Iron Curtain could be slightly parted, the world breathed easier. And more certainly the U. S. cemented old friendships and made new ones at Geneva because President Eisenhower proved again that he is a warm, sincere and effective spokesman for peace. Countries formerly leery that the U. S. could not be fully trusted with its "big nuclear stick" became less suspicious about the U. S. after the summit meetings.

The emotional binge didn't last long. The hard reality of the morning after came as facts rubbed against the surge of good feeling. It then became apparent that the very virtues of the "Geneva spirit" begot certain vices. Military men were the first to take second looks as NATO powers began to reduce their defense budgets or talk of doing so. In fact in October the military situation was so grave that NATO leaders began to show some alarm. Things worsened early in November when the Foreign Ministers' Conference began in Geneva, and the Soviet's intransigent position on German unity, German armament, and Germany's place in NATO became evident.

Defense Ministers Meet. In early October, a few weeks before the Foreign Ministers' Conference at Geneva, a meeting of NATO Defense Ministers in Paris produced a series of stern and serious warnings. Lord Ismay, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, cautioned against the Soviet "diplomacy of smiles"—even a smiling bear can "kill with a hug." Nuclear weapons did not dispense with the need for ground forces, he said.

General Sir John Whiteley, chairman of the Standing Group of the North Atlantic Alliance, cautioned that the Soviet military menace was greater than ever before. He added that Russia did not desire war, and that the maintenance of sufficient defenses by the West was the best way to avoid it. General J. Lawton Collins and General Jean Valluy, both of the Standing Group, reported the tremendous progress that the Soviet has made in producing nuclear weapons, military machinery, and jet planes.

A particularly disturbing picture of the Soviet submarine menace was presented by Admiral Jerauld Wright. He headed a panel of officers who explained that the Soviet was constructing a submarine fleet of such proportions that it could split the free world "like an iron wedge" in case of hostilities. Ready for instant operation is a Soviet submarine fleet of over four hundred craft—the greatest fleet of underwater vessels that the world has ever known. The USSR is reported to be producing three subs every two weeks. Admiral Wright pointed out that sea transport could not be replaced by air transport in time of war.

General Gruenther, the supreme commander, discussed failings in NATO. The treaty nations, he said, had not made good their time schedules for developing minimum combat forces in Europe. He stressed that air power alone could not insure the Atlantic defenses, that nuclear bombs had not replaced the need for manpower, and that naval and ground forces must be reinforced. The present air command system was "the greatest single weakness" in the European defense set-up. He recommended that the air forces should be organized into four zones: the North, Central, South, and Britain. As to the recent announced reduction of Soviet forces by 640,000 and satellite forces by 178,000, General Gruenther said that these cuts were not in combat forces and would not weaken Russia's military potential.

Other elements of Western weakness include the lack of a complete radar screen for detection of enemy aircraft, delay in creating the infra-structure program for constructing installations and communications systems for use of NATO, and the problem of maintaining all-weather fighter squadrons. This latter has become most serious, because of the high cost—\$500,000—of each aircraft.

Coincident with the Defense Ministers' Conference was an address in England by Field Marshal Montgomery. The Western organization for war was out of date, he said. He wants air forces to be organized and controlled "as one single mighty weapon of air power." A single political authority should direct the war effort from North America. There were no indications, as a result of the speech, that Britain would officially consider pooling her Royal Air Force's Fighter Command with the rest of NATO's air. Its first role has been to defend Britain in time of war, and its aircraft have not been assigned to the Atlantic Alliance.

NATO's Strategy. In the closing sessions of the Defense conference, feeling among the Defense Ministers seemed to be that there was little chance that NATO's governments would provide the funds needed to support the program outlined to them. In this light, the words of West Germany's Foreign Minister, Heinrich von Brentano, spoken on a different occasion, were particularly appropriate: "If the West should be so rash as to neglect its own security and freedom by allowing its sole effective guarantees—namely, its alliance for the maintenance of peace—to be weakened, then, I believe, the so-called relaxation of tensions would turn into disintegration and finally destruction."

How had this discouraging situation in NATO developed, when early last spring there was such a wave of optimism? Eight months ago we had such considerable strength and such sound strategy that the Communists

had changed their approach in dealing with us. We had, in the previous five years, deterred the Communists from a major war, had thwarted many of their aims, and had the capability of delivering a devastating attack on them in event of war. If a conciliatory "spirit of Geneva" is compromising our basic strategy and altering our position of strength—either by our design or by subconscious by products of the "spirit," the West should carefully evaluate what these changes are before it is too late.

Absorptive power. The power of a single mass destruction weapon to destroy an entire Army division, an air base or a city has led to the development of a concept called "absorptive power." This is the margin of strength a nation must have to absorb mass destruction attack and still continue to fight. Last spring, so great was our absorptive power and so effective was the potential of our grand strategy, that Russia, to counter and pervert it, developed a new strategy of her own. On the surface of this new strategy was the conciliatory "spirit of Geneva" attitude. Underneath, Russia appeared to have very clear-cut aims. First, she correctly evaluated the world-wide revolt of colonial countries and the resentment of Western influence. Many of these countries contained NATO bases. By fostering and encouraging these movements, Russia might see many of these countries ask NATO to leave. In event of war, many of the strategic countries might remain neutral. This, then, may well be the first element in the new Soviet strategy: the neutralization of our strategic bases.

The second element of the new Soviet strategy was that her new peace-loving attitude would foster complacency in military preparedness throughout the NATO countries. Perhaps the Russians even hoped that many of these countries could be persuaded to become neutrals. At least they might decide they did not want any atomic stockpiles, which would attract retaliation in wartime, located within their borders.

The third element apparently was to put the squeeze on whatever bases we did keep intact by building a tremendous subsurface fleet that could interdict the sea lanes to those bases.

Fourth, Russia could knock the foundation out of NATO by having either a disarmed, united Germany not in NATO, or else a complacent West Germany developing a friendly attitude toward Russia, and not fulfilling NATO commitments.

And the fifth element, by talking about restricting the use of nuclear weapons, Russia could perhaps divide the West and give the big armies of the USSR a decided advantage.

Effects of Soviet Strategy. Since the summit meeting, and in spite of the surface optimism in some diplomatic circles, NATO began to fare badly. Troop commitments began to be reduced. Sir Anthony Eden said Britain intended to reduce her fighting force by 100,000 within the next thirty months. That represents one-eighth of her total ground strength. The British informally notified General Gruenther that one or two British divisions stationed in Germany may be redeployed within eighteen months. This would mean that only twelve combat divisions would remain between the Elbe and the Rhine.

By mid October the French had withdrawn more than two divisions from the Rhine because of the fighting over colonial issues in North Africa.

The expected build-up of the West German Army, so

important in NATO plans, looks especially gloomy. Enlistments have dropped 80 per cent. There are three reasons for this: Relaxed tensions had resulted in military apathy in West Germany just like it had in all other NATO countries. Secondly, the parliament had reduced the military pay scales. And thirdly, Chancellor Adenauer, who, before he made his visit to Moscow, had said he would make no agreements with Russia unless she were willing to negotiate on German unity, had returned from Moscow, having agreed to establish full diplomatic relations with the USSR. The Soviet, of course, had resorted to the bait of returning German prisoners for the agreement. Prospects for the 500,000 German armed force for NATO did not look good.

The USSR even got her finger in the pot in the Near East by sponsoring the Czech-Egyptian arms deal. As the arms began arriving, Israel solemnly warned that she could not stand by while Egypt built up military superiority.

Meanwhile, 5,500 U. S. troops were being transferred from Austria to Italy under the terms of the Big Four treaty signed last spring giving Austria full independence. Brigadier General John H. Michaelis, USA, was appointed to head the new Southern European Task Force, with headquarters at Vicenza, Italy. New U. S. missile weapons, capable of firing atomic warheads, were assigned his command.

About the only military bright spot anywhere was Iran's joining the Turkish-Pakistani Iraqi-British alliance. Thus the "northern defense tier," suggested by Secretary Dulles in 1953, was completed.

NATO's Political Troubles. The new Soviet strategy of inducing complacency practically allowed her to mix in local NATO quarrels. A lack of political coordination among the organization members resulted in issues being thrown into the UN rather than being settled within NATO itself. Greece and Iceland, for example, voted against France in the UN. Greece took the Cyprus issue to the UN—not NATO. It has even been said that the United States should have prevented the Algerian question from being put on the UN agenda. A closing of NATO ranks was needed, so that there would be unity in diplomacy as well as in military matters.

The pattern of Soviet moves described here appears to be designed to give the USSR the opportunity to wreck the grand strategy that the West has developed since 1950. In eight short months the West has passed from the period of great military optimism in the early spring of 1955 to deep-seated alarm in late fall of the same year.

The discouraging events following Geneva do not mean that the President's attempt to reach a meeting of the minds with the Russians was a mistake or that he was even slightly taken in by Russian wiles. Certainly the ultimate aim of all statesmanship, next to preserving individual freedom under the law, should be the avoidance of a nuclear war. And even the slightest parting of the Iron Curtain could permit a little Western atmosphere to seep into Russia and warm the Russian people.

However, the West cannot forget the perils that face it if it relaxes its defense. If the USSR gains a position of strength, we cannot expect that she will then act from high moral principles in the "spirit of Geneva." Continued complacency could mean that in a few years most of our strategic bases will have been neutralized, our sea lanes threatened, our air superiority lessened, and our armies reduced to near impotence if faced with nuclear war.



Report from your AUSA CP

Item not on the agenda was important development at special meeting of Executive Council of your Association 2 November. Meeting was called by Gen. Weible, Vice President, to reorganize council for more efficient operation. Gen. Lemnitzer, President, on duty in Far East since March, had dated letter of resignation 22 October, instructed Secretary to tender it to Council at "next meeting." Council accepted resignation with deep regret, passed resolution expressing appreciation for Gen. Lemnitzer's services, especially with reference to merger of AA Association.

Gen. Lemnitzer wrote: ". . . I recognize that my transfer to the Far East Command has unfortunately precluded my attendance at the meetings of the Executive Council and also prevented me from taking the active role in the affairs of the Association which I had hoped to take. . . . I do not intend to imply in any manner whatsoever a lessening of my interest in the Association or the stated objectives thereof. . . ."

Under provisions of By-Laws, Gen. Weible automatically took office as President; Council asked Nominating Committee to bring names of nominees for Vice President to 22d Regular Meeting.

Purpose of special meeting was the reorganization of the Council for more efficient operation; to decentralize some activities that now require full Council action. Gen. Weible believed a committee plan, developing Council specialists in various fields, would save time, discussion, at meetings. Council approved Gen. Weible's plan.

Indicative of Council's pace these days, committee assignments were made next day, letters typed and signed following day (Friday). Practically all Council members had committee assignments, instructions Monday, and were to submit draft committee

Officers and Executive Council of the Association of the U. S. Army

PRESIDENT

Lt. Gen. Walter L. Weible, USA

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

Col. Robert F. Cocklin, Arty-NGUS

VICE PRESIDENT

Vacancy

ACTING TREASURER

Lt. Arthur S. Welch, CE-NGUS

SECRETARY

Col. Arthur Symons, Arty-USAR

ASSISTANT TREASURER

N. J. Anthony

EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

For the term ending June 1956

Gen. W. B. Palmer, USA

Maj. Gen. W. F. Marquat, USA

Maj. Gen. James C. Fry, USA

Maj. Gen. Donald P. Booth, USA

Maj. Gen. H. McK. Roper, USA-Ret.

Maj. Gen. Louis W. Prentiss, USA

Brig. Gen. John B. Moore, NGUS

Col. Alex J. Robinet, Inf-USAR

Col. George V. Selwyn, Arty-NGUS

Capt. John H. Bolton, Jr., CE-NGUS

For the term ending June 1957

Asst. Sec. of the Army Hugh M. Milton II
(Maj. Gen.-USAR)

Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin, USA

Maj. Gen. Bryan L. Milburn, USA

Maj. Gen. W. H. Abendroth, NGUS

Maj. Gen. Raleigh R. Hendrix, USA

Col. Charles W. McCarthy, Inf-USA

Col. Charles A. H. Thomson, Inf-USAR

Col. William B. Bunker, TC-USA

Col. W. E. Maulsby, Jr., Armor-USA

Capt. Sam W. Sacra, Armor-USAR

For the term ending June 1958

Maj. Gen. William S. Lawton, USA

Maj. Gen. James D. O'Connell, USA

Brig. Gen. Theodore S. Riggs, USA

Brig. Gen. W. C. Westmoreland, USA

Brig. Gen. Philip F. Lindeman, USAR

Brig. Gen. Robert L. Cook, USA

Col. Walter F. Ellis, Arty-USA

Col. Harold G. Haskell, Arty-USA

Col. A. D. Surles, Jr., Inf-USA

MSgt. Eugene F. Britti, Inf-USA

"**The Association of the U. S. Army** shall be an organization wherein all who are in accord with its objectives may join in the exchange of ideas and information on military matters, and in fostering, supporting, and advocating the legitimate and proper role of the Army of the United States and of all its elements, branches, and components in providing for and assuring the Nation's military security." (Statement by the Executive Council, Association of the U. S. Army; adopted 14 December 1953.)

charter to President by 20 November, for submission to Council for approval at 22d Regular Meeting.

Committee assignments follow:

Finance Committee: Gen. W. B. Palmer (Chm), Maj. Gen. W. S. Lawton, Brig. Gen. W. C. Westmoreland, Cols. A. D. Surles, Jr. and C. W. McCarthy, Capts. J. H. Bolton, Jr. and Sam W. Sacra.

Nominations Committee: Maj. Gen. D. P. Booth (Chm), Hon. Hugh M. Milton, II, Maj. Gen. James D. O'Connell, Cols. George V. Selwyn and William E. Maulsby, Jr.

Membership Committee: Maj. Gen. J. C. Fry (Chm), Maj. Gens. B. L. Milburn and W. H. Abendroth, Brig. Gens. P. F. Lindeman and J. B. Moore, Col. W. F. Ellis.

Magazine and Publicity Committee: Maj. Gen. W. F. Marquat (Chm), Maj. Gens. L. W. Prentiss and W. H. Abendroth, Cols. W. B. Bunker, C. A. H. Thomson and H. G. Haskell, M/Sgt Eugene F. Britti.

Annual Meeting Arrangements Committee: Maj. Gen. L. W. Prentiss (Chm), Lt. Gen. J. M. Gavin, Maj. Gen. D. P. Booth, Brig. Gen. T. S. Riggs, Cols. C. W. McCarthy and W. F. Ellis.

Organization Committee: Maj. Gen. H. McK. Roper (Chm), Maj. Gen. J. D. O'Connell, Cols. A. J. Robinet, C. W. McCarthy, W. B. Bunker and A. D. Surles, Jr.

Resolutions Committee: Brig. Gen. J. B. Moore (Chm), Maj. Gen. R. R. Hendrix, Col. W. F. Ellis, Capt. J. H. Bolton.

Awards Committee: Col. A. J. Robinet (Chm), Maj. Gens. R. R. Hendrix and J. D. O'Connell.

Advertising Committee: Col. G. V. Selwyn (Chm), Cols. W. E. Maulsby, Jr., H. G. Haskell and W. B. Bunker, Brig. Gen. R. L. Cook

As reports come into Association offices, Annual Meeting at Benning was huge success. Newspaper coverage exceeded expectations; all major wire services, Chicago Tribune, New York Times, other major media covered event widely. Metropolitan radio stations mentioned Association repeatedly Saturday, using Gen. Gavin's predictions of things to come as primary peg. Mr. Brucker's admonition to Reserve commanders to get out and recruit also made news and multiplied mentions of Association.

Secretary-Editors of other military associations, impressed by Annual Meeting, became members of Association. One handed your Secretary his five dollars during refreshment period after dinner Friday night; another came to Association office to join Monday after meeting; still another stopped staff member on the street to sign up.

Civilian VIPs at meeting also signed up; several wrote thoughtful letters offering ideas for advancing Association. Meeting also awakened interest among Army personnel. Some Generals, long-time members, have again become actively interested and have pledged whole-hearted support.

Problem is still membership. Every thousand increase relieves financial pressure, brings closer expansion of magazine, strengthens Association's voice as spokesman for Army. Tell your friends; price of membership is less than bottle of good cheer. There's new vigor, determination among Council and staff. We're on the way . . .

YOUR SECRETARY

Secretary's Report on AUSA Business Meeting

THE business session of the first Annual Meeting of the United States Army was called to order at Post Theater #1, Fort Benning, Georgia, at 0830, 22 October 1955, by the Vice President, Lt. Gen. Walter L. Weible, in the absence of the Association's President, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer.

General Weible opened the meeting with the following statement:

WHEN the matter of setting up this first meeting was being studied by the Executive Council, considerable thought was given to where the meeting should be held. Since our Association represents the whole Army, we were reluctant to single out a location so specifically identified with a particular branch. However, we recognized that we would encounter many problems in our first meeting that would require experience and facilities not readily available at every Army installation. The Council, made up of members of all branches and services—were unanimous in their opinion that Fort Benning, by past demonstrated experience, was best qualified to assure the success of our first meeting.

In future years we expect to hold our meetings at other Army installations, so that all the membership may have an opportunity to become better acquainted with all branches and services. Those of us who have been actively participating in the direction of the Association's affairs feel that this particular session of our Annual Meeting is most important. It provides us with an unique opportunity to get from a broad segment of our membership expressions and suggestions as to the future course of our Association.

The scope of the program of this Annual Meeting indi-

of our membership than we get in the normal conduct of our affairs during the year. Consequently, I urge you to submit any suggestions, questions, or ideas which will contribute to our objectives. The development of our Association to its present stature has been a long and at times discouraging task. However, in recent years our progress has been steadily improving as the realization of the need for such an association has become more readily apparent.

One of the great weaknesses of the Army has been that we do not speak with a single voice on all important issues. Too often our interests have been divided and much of our effort has been dissipated because it has been devoted to the narrower interests of branch, service and component. All those familiar with present day problems confronting the Army know that our future depends in large measure upon our ability to close ranks promptly and effectively for the good of the Army of the United States as a whole rather than for the different elements thereof.

One of the primary purposes of this Association is to help bring the branches, services and components closer together so that all members of the Army will speak with one voice when the occasion demands.

If we are to develop this Association to the point where we can truly accomplish these objectives, it will require a more widespread effort than we have had in the past. These things cannot be done by order or direction but require leadership and, to a degree, salesmanship. Later in the program our membership committee will report on the efforts which they have made in this direction. Perhaps some of you will have suggestions that we can use. Certainly, all of you can help materially by promoting membership in the Association from among your associates.


A FEW OF HUNDREDS OF PRESS CLIPPINGS TESTIFY TO THE COMPLETE COVERAGE GIVEN THE MEETING BY THE U. S. PRESS

cates the desire that our Association become more representative of the entire Army. The Executive Council felt, too, that the name of our magazine needed modification to more truly reflect the editorial content as well as the membership. Consequently, action has already been taken to change the name of the magazine from THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL to ARMY. This change becomes effective the first of the year.

We need also the advice and guidance of a larger portion

THE Chairman then called on Col. Arthur Symons, USAR, Secretary and General Manager of the Association, to make a report on Association activities. Col. Symons' brief report touched on THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL, Combat Forces Book Service, Combat Forces Press, the Association's ROTC Medal program, personal services to members, and other operations.

General Weible called on Col. Robert F. Cocklin, Assistant Secretary and Business Manager, for a report on



Mr. Brucker and General Taylor are greeted by Honor Guards on their arrival at the AUSA meeting.



the financial status. Col. Cocklin reported that during the five years of the Association's existence it had shown an operating profit of \$12,195.92, and an increase in net worth of \$54,392.13 during the same period. The addition of \$48,734.92 from the assets of the Antiaircraft Association brought the net worth to \$200,477.92 as of 2 January 1955.

The Chairman called on Maj. Gen. James C. Fry, of the Membership Committee, for a report from that Committee. General Fry reported that members of his committee wrote personal letters to all senior commanders in the field, and that this campaign, backed up with promotional material, brought in 11,000 memberships for a net gain of 7,500 memberships above the previous annual level. In September General Weible assembled the Committee for a review of accomplishments and exploration of methods for a more sustained drive. This meeting brought forth a program of urging increased cooperation from the Chiefs of Technical and Administrative Services, and a campaign by General Fry personally, addressed to Armor units. General Lindeman contacted ROTC instructors and Scabbard and Blade units, and also initiated a campaign to contact the Presidents of World War II Division Associations.

General Fry also reported that a program is being initiated to get in touch with Division and Regimental Commanders on a year-round basis, that further effort would be made to solicit young officers and potential officers, and that the Executive Council was interested in improving the contents of the JOURNAL so that the magazine itself would interest potential members even more than in the past.

COLONEL McCarthy, reporting for the Resolutions Committee, offered the resolutions that appeared in the last month's JOURNAL, except the resolution dealing with granting Association membership as a group to other associations. This was introduced from the floor by Colonel Raff. All resolutions, after discussion, were passed.

General Creasy suggested that the membership should have an opportunity to study the resolutions before the business meeting. General Weible indicated this would be done at future meetings.

Capt. Ayres suggested the formation of chapters, starting at major military posts. It was moved that Capt. Ayres' suggestion be considered by the Executive Council; General Hershey seconded the motion. The motion was passed. General McGowan indicated there was a need for more civilian leadership in the Association.

It was suggested from the floor that Forts Sill and Knox be considered as sites for future meetings. General Fry suggested Fort Belvoir, and General Sturgis asked that Fort Belvoir be considered. Col. Raff recommended Fort Bragg. General Parks suggested that a schedule of future meeting sites be drawn up.

General Parks moved that the Association go on record as thanking the Commanding General, The Infantry Center, for his hospitality and expressing the Association's appreciation for the many courtesies it had received at Fort Benning. General Herren seconded the motion, and it was passed unanimously.

General Bolte moved the meeting adjourn. The motion was passed.

ARTHUR SYMONS
Secretary



One of the men who made things click: Lt. Col. Samuel E. Shoemaker, Infantry Center project officer for the meeting

THE MONTH'S AUTHORS

COLONEL JOHN M. PITZER, JAGC ("The Nature of Command," page 19), is Chief of the Defense Appellate Division of TJAGO. A graduate of the University of Nebraska, he was an officer in the Army Reserve and the 134th Infantry, Nebraska National Guard, 1934-40. He practiced law at Nebraska City from 1932 to 1940 then went on active duty. He served at Selective Service national headquarters, in TJAGO, and over three years as assistant staff JA and executive to the ETO judge advocate. **COLONEL PITZER** was integrated into the Regular Army in 1943. Subsequently he has completed tours at various posts as staff JA, and served in Korea with Korean Base Section and at I Corps. He is a 1955 graduate of the Army War College.

"Hollywood Can't Make Soldiers" (page 22) is the sixth major contribution to these columns by **LIEUTENANT COLONEL EDWARD M. FLANAGAN, JR., Artillery**. **COLONEL FLANAGAN** is a 1943 graduate of West Point. He served with the 11th and 82d Airborne Divisions from 1943 to 1950; during 1953 and 1954 he commanded the 674th Airborne FA Battalion in Korea and Japan. He is rated master parachutist, and is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College (1955). Currently he is with the Plans Section of Career Management Division. He is the author of *The Angels: A History of the 11th Airborne Division, 1943-1946*.

COLONEL CARLETON E. FISHER, Infantry ("Don't Give Up the Regiment," page 26), was an enlisted man in the 103d Infantry, (Maine National Guard), from 1935 to 1937. He came on active

duty with that regiment as an officer in 1941, served in France and Germany with the 2d Infantry Division, and in 1944 went to the 29th Infantry Division as a battalion commander. He was integrated into the Regular Army in 1946, was an Army Adviser for

the Connecticut National Guard from 1947 to 1950, and during 1951-52 was chief of a field training team with a Turkish division. **COLONEL FISHER** is on duty in the Organization Branch of G3.

CAPTAIN JOHN G. MANTALAS, Infantry ("Let's All Fly on Platforms," page

DECEMBER 1955

25), enlisted in the Coast Artillery Corps in 1940, served forty-three months in ETO during World War II, was commissioned after graduating from Infantry OCS at Fontainebleau in 1945, and was integrated into the Regular Army in 1950. In Korea he served with the 65th Infantry (3d Infantry Division). He is now contracting officer with the Japan Procurement Agency in Yokohama.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL TOCSIN ("The Sheep and the Goats," page 29), is the pseudonym of an Artillery officer who was fortunate enough to have been selected to become a sheep.

MAJOR LOUIS MORTON, MI, USAR ("The Glory and Tragedy of Bataan," page 34), is Chief of the War History Division and Deputy Chief Historian of the Current Branch in the Office of the Chief of Military History. He was commissioned in the Signal Corps in January 1943, served during World War II as historical officer of Headquarters South Pacific and the Philippines, and did a hitch in the historical branch of G2 after the war. He is the author of *The Fall of the Philippines*, a volume in the Army's official history.



MAJOR MORTON

LYNN MONTROSS ("They Made the Sun Stand Still," page 40), has specialized in the Nation's first and last wars—the American Revolution and the Korean conflict. **MR. MONTROSS** is a historian at the Washington headquarters of the Marine Corps.

COLONEL STILSON H. SMITH, Finance Corps ("Misinterpretation," page 47), was commissioned in the Infantry after graduation from West Point in 1934. He transferred to the Finance Corps in 1940, and served as Chief of the Disbursing Division, Office of Dependency Benefits, and as finance officer at St. Louis and in the Caribbean. He is a graduate of the The Infantry School (1938), The Finance School (1940), and the Armed Forces Staff College (1953). He is now Assistant Comptroller, Headquarters Second Army.

MAJOR JOHN H. CUSHMAN, Infantry

("Mobility is Men," page 47), is an occasional contributor to this magazine. A 1944 graduate of the Military Academy, he is now assigned to the Reserve and Analysis Division of the faculty of the Command and General Staff College.

LIEUTENANT FRANK C. BENEDICT, Infantry ("Bound by Honor, or Paper?," page 47), enlisted in the Army in 1946 and won an RA appointment to West Point. After graduation in 1952 he attended the service schools, spent a year with the 82d Airborne Division, and sixteen months in Korea, most of the time as a company commander in the 17th Infantry. He is an instructor in infantry tactics at TA&GMS at Fort Sill.

MAJOR JOHN E. MURRAY, Transportation Corps ("Need a Lift? Salute!," page 48) is special assistant to the Chief of Transportation. A Reserve officer, he has been on active duty since 1941.

BRIGADIER GENERAL HAROLD T. MILLER, USA, Retired ("Better Efficiency Reports," page 49), is a 1920 West Point graduate who holds a civil engineer degree from Rensselaer (1922), an MS from Pennsylvania State College (1928), and an MA from the University of Chicago (1930). He was assistant Chief of Transportation before retiring in June 1954 to take his present job as Assistant General Manager of the Los Angeles Harbor Department.

DAVID MANKER ("NATO's Strategy and NATO's Troubles," page 52), is the pseudonym of an officer who recently resigned from the Army to study international affairs.

This month's book reviewers include **MAJOR GENERAL GORDON B. ROGERS, USA**, a 1924 graduate of West Point who was assistant commander of the 40th Infantry Division in Korea, Chief of Korean MAG, CG of the 3d Armored Division, and is now Deputy Director of the Staff of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee, National Security Council; **HANSON W. BALDWIN**, military editor of *The New York Times*, who is well known to our readers; **BRIGADIER GENERAL DONALD ARMSTRONG**, a contributing editor to *The JOURNAL*; **STEPAN T. POSSONY**, Professor of International Politics at Georgetown University; **COLONEL S. LEGREE** and **COLONEL AARON A. GUNNER**, pseudonyms of artillery officers.

THE MONTH'S BOOKS

Through the Period of Confusion

ASSAULT BATTLE DRILL

By Maj. Gen. James C. Fry
114 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$2.00

Reviewed by

MAJ. GEN. GORDON B. ROGERS

To those who fought in Korea, where, due to the constant rotation of officers and men, a trained team could not be kept together, this book will be welcome. It advances an idea which provides at least a partial solution to the problem of quickly training and fighting green troops.

General Fry advocates a battle drill or SOP for the infantry squad and platoon designed to carry them through the period of confusion and indecision associated with the last violent actions of infantry in the attack. Perhaps the greatest cause of failure by small units in close combat is loss of control by the leader. Noise, fear, dispersion, and concealment make it extremely difficult for the small-unit leader to get his decisions to his men. A battle drill understood by all would minimize this difficulty.

It is admitted that when conditions allow, an action based on a field order is superior. The battle drill is designed to permit cohesive action in the many cases in which it is impossible for the small-unit leader to issue detailed orders. Any plan understood by all and executed with confidence is superior to the most perfect plan which is not understood.

The book will appeal to many by restating the battle-tested method of advance by the squad in the attack, in which not more than one or two men at a time rush, while covered by the rifle fire of the remainder of the team. Many of us have experienced the frustration and depression occasioned by small-unit failures with unnecessary losses, due primarily to the attempt to advance simultaneously by whole squads, platoons, and even companies.

The author is particularly well qualified to discuss the subject of the small unit in close combat. From personal participation in such actions he has derived insight and understanding which are rare. As was well known by his associates in Korea, he devoted much care and thought to experimenting with ways in which to solve the problems of the small unit in close combat. This book is one result.

While we may differ in some details, the book is well worth reading, and should provide the basis for further discussion and experimentation toward improvement in a vital element of infantry combat.

Professional and Moral Failure

THE POLITICS OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMY, 1640-1945

By Gordon A. Craig
Oxford, At the Clarendon Press, 1955
536 Pages; Index; \$11.50

Reviewed by

STEFAN T. POSSONY

This book is a landmark in American history-writing. Professor Craig has produced what promises to be the definitive story of the Prussian Army, minus its battles and campaigns. The author is an expert's expert. An excellent stylist, he has full mastery of his subject and of the entire documentation. Without exception his judgments are as sound as his facts and his interpretations. He knows all sides of the many controversies raging about the Prussian military and their interventions into German politics and world history. It probably would be impossible to surpass the author's objectivity. This reviewer could quarrel only with a few details and two or three questions of emphasis.

After all the evidence has been adduced, there is no doubt about the final verdict: despite periods of glory, the professional competence of the Prussian-German army was restricted to battlefield tactics. After Moltke the Elder, the German Army did not produce one single soldier who could be classed as a statesman or even as a first-class strategist. The great names of recent German military history—Schlieffen, Hindenburg, Ludendorff, Seeckt, Schleicher, Blomberg, Brauchitsch, Rundstedt—they all denoted national disaster; only Wilhelm Gröner was an exception of sorts. The impact of these soldiers on German politics was, historically speaking, more important than their military achievements. Their guilt in connection with 1914-18, the collapse of German democracy, Hitler's advent to power, World War II, and finally the ruin of Germany and Russia's advance to the Elbe, while not exclusive, was clear and heavy. The celebrated Prussian generals were both professional

and moral failures. The evidence allows no other conclusion.

The American military reader should study *The Politics of the Prussian Army* with care. He will find it interesting to read the truth about the old enemy. He will profit from learning about the many difficulties which the inter-relationships between politics and defense posed in an alien *milieu*. Many security problems which the Germans had to face between 1871 and 1914 show striking parallels with current perplexities. The book is instructive about the political responsibilities of high-ranking soldiers and the reciprocal obligations of the diplomats. By implication, it shows the wisdom of the U. S. system of broad military education, although it casts doubts about the sufficiency of the purely professional-military knowledge which is being imparted by that system. These problems of military politics and education seem to be eternal. The German example shows how not to run an army and how not to set up relations with political decision-makers.

Professor Craig's book comes at the right time to serve as a *vade mecum* for those German and American officers who, with seeing eyes, want to proceed to a better future.

A last remark: Despite an abundance of documents and other data, there is no political history of the armed forces of the United States. This gap in American history-writing is very discouraging. What is wrong with our historians? Let us hope that this outstanding volume will induce the young generation of historians to follow on the thorny but rewarding path of military history.

Essentials of Combat Intelligence

RISKS: The Key to Combat Intelligence
By Col. Elias Carter Townsend
Military Service Publishing Co., 1955
82 Pages; Index; \$1.00

Reviewed by

HANSON W. BALDWIN

"Never predict," my managing editor told me just prior to World War II. "If you are right, no one will remember; if you are wrong, the world will let you know."

Colonel Townsend voices this same warning against an intelligence guessing

A Selected Check List of the Month's Books

This run-down of some of the books received for review during the month preceding our deadline is to give our readers who like to follow current literature a monthly check list of the most important, useful and potentially popular books. Full reviews of some of these books will appear in this or subsequent issues. Any of these titles may be purchased through the Combat Forces Book Service. See page 64 for order coupon and a complete listing of Selected Books for Military Readers.

ADMINISTRATION IN THE BURMA CAMPAIGN, 1941-1945. Major B. N. Majumdar. Clifton & Company, India, 1955. 68 Pages; Illustrated; About \$1.00. A very short, almost magazine-article length discussion of some of the logistical and administrative problems.

THE AMERICAN TREASURY, 1455-1955. Selected, with Commentary by Clifton Fadiman, assisted by Charles Van Doren. Harper & Brothers, 1955. 1,108 Pages; Index; \$7.50. "Our modest claim is this: here is a collection of interesting, diverting, beautiful or inspiring statements made by 1,300 Americans." A luxury item for those who have the time and the desire to sample America from the printed word.

THE AMERICAN WARS, 1755-1953: A Pictorial History from Quebec to Korea. Roy Meredith. The World Publishing Company, 1955. 349 Pages; Illustrated; \$10.00. Despite the title, there are no photographs. A superb collection, although possibly more interesting as art than as a record of war.

BUFFALO BILL: King of the Old West. Elizabeth Jane Leonard and Julia Cody Goodman; edited by James Williams Hoffman. Library Publishers, 1955. 320 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$4.95. A most sympathetic biography (Cody's sister is one of the authors). Well illustrated.

THE CALL TO HONOUR: Volume I of the War Memoirs of General de Gaulle. The Viking Press, 1955. 319 Pages; Index; \$5.00. DeGaulle's difficult personality and dogged determination shine through every page. This volume brings us to mid-1942.

THE CIVIL WAR IN PICTURES. Arranged with Commentary by Fletcher Pratt. Henry Holt & Company, 1955. 256 Pages; \$10.00. A collection of contemporary Civil War illustrations (no photographs) depicting actions in that conflict, and held together with Fletcher Pratt's short commentaries. Nostalgic, but hardly informative for the historian; interesting for the Civil War fan.

THE COMMISSARY COOKBOOK. By Michele. Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1955. 138 Pages; Index; \$1.25. How to eat like a gourmet on commissary supplies,

or Waldorf meals from QM issue. This should wake up the Army wife and add to the problems of the soldier trying to diet.

DIARY OF A DYING EMPIRE. Hans Peter Hansen; translated by Oscar O. Winther. Indiana University Press, 1955. 409 Pages; Index; \$6.75. A member of the German Reichstag records the 1914-18 home-front problems of Germany's death throes. Fragmentary but revealing.

DOCUMENTS ON SOVIET MILITARY LAW AND ADMINISTRATION. Edited and translated by Harold J. Berman and Miroslav Kerner. Harvard University Press, 1955. 164 Pages; \$4.00. The companion volume to *Soviet Military Law and Administration* containing the actual documents. Useful for specialists in the field.

ENEMIES ARE HUMAN. Reinhold Palbel. The John C. Winston Company, 1955. 248 Pages; \$3.50. The war experiences of a German soldier who fought in Russia and Italy, and escaped from a POW camp in the U. S. Finally caught, he had opened a bookstore in Chicago. He has now entered the U. S. legally, for a happy ending.

THE ENGINEERING OF CONSENT. Edited by Edward L. Bernays. University of Oklahoma Press, 1955. 246 Pages; Index; \$3.75. The experts in the field tell how to make the public do what you want it to do, whether it be to buy Toasty-Woasties or vote for Zilch. Understandable—and frightening to think all of us are puppets of science.

HOW TO RUN A CLUB. Harry Simmons. Harper & Brothers, 1955. 308 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$3.95. Parliamentary procedure, public speaking, organization, programming, and the rest of the mechanics of organizations. Useful and clear.

LINCOLN AND THE BLUEGRASS: Slavery and Civil War in Kentucky. William H. Townsend. University of Kentucky Press, 1955. 392 Pages; Index; \$6.50. Lincoln's personal knowledge of slavery and the social and political conflicts it caused are disclosed in this remarkably vivid description of life in slaveholding central Kentucky, home of Lin-

coln's wife, in the decades before the Civil War and during the war itself.

MEMOIRS BY HARRY S. TRUMAN: Volume I, Year of Decisions. Doubleday & Company, 1955. 596 Pages, Index; \$5.00. The first volume of the life and times of one of our most controversial Presidents, and one who is as outspoken as the times permit. A document of history by a man who helped make it.

ON THE TRACK OF PREHISTORIC MAN. Herbert Kuhn. Random House, 1955. 211 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$3.95. An expert describes the scientific investigations on prehistoric man and his art, found in European caves. For the very few whose tastes run in this direction.

PICTORIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTS. John and Alice Durant. A. S. Barnes & Company, 1955. 320 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$10.00. Hundreds of photographs and clear text which bring closer the lives, campaigns and terms of office of all our Presidents including Dwight D. Eisenhower to the time of his inauguration.

RISKS: The Key to Combat Intelligence. Col. Elias Carter Townsend. Military Service Publishing Company, 1955. 82 Pages; Index; \$1.00. The thesis is that whether we know it or not, we have gone back to judging intentions rather than capabilities; G2 ought to furnish information rather than clairvoyance and predictions. Short, clear, thought-provoking.

THE STAFF ROLE IN MANAGEMENT: Its Creative Uses. Robert C. Sampson. Harper & Brothers, 1955. 226 Pages; Index; \$4.00. Industry's methods of using the staff to further management's goals, with ideas on how to integrate specialized outlooks into the whole problem. A useful, especially clearly written, book for students of organization.

THREE YEARS WITH GRANT: As Recalled by War Correspondent Sylvanus Cadwallader. Edited and with an introduction and notes by Benjamin P. Thomas. Alfred A. Knopf, 1955. 362 Pages; Index; Maps; \$4.75. A long-forgotten manuscript throws some interesting light on one of the Civil War's controversial figures. Exceptionally readable.

game in his common-sense, down-to-earth little book. The better newspaper analyses and intelligence estimates have much in common, but neither is superior to the facts on which they are based. Attempts by either a columnist or an intelligence officer to leap into the wild blue yonder of the future defy logic, invite ignominious failure, and reduce the prestige of the author—and, incidentally, of the profession of which he is a member. A crystal ball is not listed in the T/O&E of an

Army unit.

Risks: The Key to Combat Intelligence makes all this amply clear in a readable, easily understood and logical style. This little book gets down to bedrock essentials in combat intelligence and makes a very strong case indeed for a much-needed major revision of current combat intelligence concepts. Get rid of the "guessimates" in intelligence and concentrate on the fundamentals: the location and strength of the enemy.

Colonel Townsend makes a strong and clear case, so strong, so clear, and so concise that, to this reviewer, *Risks* is one of the best books on combat intelligence produced since World War II. Yet there is nothing in it that should not be self-evident; there is nothing essentially new. The book's merit consists not only in its economy of words (it can be read in one easy sitting) but in its logic and its re-emphasis of old truths.

Colonel Townsend's thesis can be sum-

med up—in his own words—in a nutshell:

"There are two, and only two, essential elements of enemy information: These are enemy location and strength."

"Enemy capabilities are determined from enemy location and strength."

And, given this information, a commander—but not his intelligence officer—can determine his risks.

"In essence, the whole purpose of combat intelligence," Colonel Townsend writes, "its whole reason for being, should be to reduce or eliminate the commander's unknown risks."

The author uses numerous examples—notably Pearl Harbor, the Normandy landing, the Battle of the Bulge—to show how disaster occurred when these fundamental principles of combat intelligence were ignored. Failure to "find and fix," failure to determine enemy strength, attempts to guess the enemy's intentions rather than defining his capabilities, and freewheeling G2s who usurp some of the functions of command have caused heavy casualties and lost battles.

Colonel Townsend could have fortified his conclusions with many other examples in addition to those cited. The Chinese intervention in Korea is a good example; enemy intentions rather than enemy capabilities determined our actions, and we guessed wrong. The Battle of Midway is

a happier case history; here, we knew in advance of the battle the enemy's exact strength and location (through communications intelligence); our unknown risks were therefore minimized.

Colonel Townsend is not too much concerned in his book with methods of collection of combat intelligence. "Technically and mechanically," he says, "our combat intelligence is superb"; the problems arise from "improper orientation of effort and mistaken ideas of what can and should be accomplished."

Fundamentally this is correct, but this reviewer would not give quite as high marks as Colonel Townsend does to our "technical and mechanical" means of collection and collation and integration. These means and methods are no better than the trained men who utilize them; and in war after war, battle after battle, we have had to relearn the same old basic intelligence lessons. Aggressive patrolling, for instance, is perhaps the single most important means of collecting intelligence information; it is fundamental to good soldiering. Yet perennially, in war and maneuvers, weaknesses in patrolling are noted. In Korea, when Eighth Army retreated south of the 38th parallel after the Chinese onslaught, contacts with the enemy were lost for a time; patrols failed in their purpose.

But *Risks* is concerned primarily with our combat intelligence system, not with training or mechanics. Colonel Townsend wants nothing less than a complete revision of this system; he wants us to return to the good old days when G2s did not try to be prophets; when commanders, not their staff officers, made the estimates. To do this, he would "eliminate the intelligence estimate"; drop the "relative probability of adoption" of enemy capabilities (which is really a guess at the enemy's intentions); stress "the unreliability of indications"; "have the intelligence officer publish only a summary of factual data to a command—no opinions"; and "instill in all personnel a passionate desire to ascertain enemy location and strength—never be satisfied—never cease searching."

Enemy location and strength and "speed in their determination"—is of higher importance than ever in the atomic age, when nuclear weapons depend for their effectiveness upon the determination of targets of opportunity, and rapid transmission of these data through command channels.

If our combat intelligence system is revised in accordance with Colonel Townsend's fundamental precepts, its efficiency will be increased, its processes speeded up, the author believes. This reviewer agrees with him.

But whether at the same time the prestige of intelligence would be increased by divesting G2 of the robe of the prophet, I am not sure. It seems to me that pres-

tige comes not only from within but from without. My mind goes back to pre-World War II days when G2 was the only assistant chief of the General Staff without a star. The Army—and, for that matter, the other services—has, for too long, tended to downgrade intelligence. Part of this tendency, but not all of it, is due to the faults that have grown up within the intelligence system. These faults most emphatically should be remedied and along the lines Colonel Townsend suggests. But at the same time there must be an Army-wide appreciation of the importance of intelligence, and there must be a chance for its experts to specialize without impairment of their professional careers.

Dusting Off Ulysses

THREE YEARS WITH GRANT


As Recalled by War Correspondent Sylvanus Cadwallader
Edited, and with an Introduction and Notes,
by Benjamin P. Thomas
Alfred A. Knopf, 1955
362 Pages; Maps; Index; \$4.75

Reviewed by
BRIG. GEN. DONALD ARMSTRONG

Sylvanus Cadwallader had a rare opportunity to observe history in the making. During the three climactic years of General Grant's military career—from the beginning of the Vicksburg campaign to Appomattox—this journalist, who could use his pen as well as his eyes and ears, closely watched General Grant and the staff work at headquarters, the other generals and the lower ranks of Grant's army in action. Unfortunately for past generations, the manuscript of his lively and perceptive record has been gathering dust on the shelves of the Illinois State Historical Library. Now the distinguished biographer of Abraham Lincoln has dusted it off, removed the trivial and the inconsequential, annotated it and tied the parts together with his own brief but illuminating commentary. We owe Mr. Thomas an enthusiastic vote of thanks, and hearty posthumous applause to Mr. Cadwallader for adding this meaningful primary historical source to our Civil War library.

Seldom has anyone succeeded in showing the human significance and drama of Grant's life as effectively as Cadwallader in this eyewitness account. The longer episodes and anecdotes, and the many fleeting glimpses of Grant in repose and in action re-create the character and personality and the flavor of the man. It does more. It makes the military history of those three years of Grant's leadership colorful and living to a degree unequalled elsewhere. It shows the flesh and blood behind the generalizations of the historians, the interplay of ambitions and emotions that illuminate the mind and character of the North's greatest soldier.

Mr. Cadwallader was a thirty-six-year-



CADET GRAY
A Pictorial History of Life at
West Point as Seen Through
Its Uniforms
Just published!

This is the definitive, authoritative story of West Point from its beginnings in 1802, as told by Colonel Frederick P. Todd, Director of the West Point Museum. In addition to 168 magnificent photographs (many of which have never been published before), the book contains 16 pages of full-color detailed drawings of cadets and their uniforms by Frederick T. Chapman, the well known heraldic artist. The price is \$7.50 and the book is worth every cent of it.

Order From

Combat Forces Book Service
1529 18th St. N.W., Washington 6, D.C.

old newspaperman when he reported to Grant's headquarters in the late summer of 1862 as a representative of the copperhead Chicago *Times*. On the train going south he had heard military fellow passengers utter scurrilous and slanderous attacks on General Grant. "He never did amount to anything and never would," they said; "he was nothing but a drunken, wooden-headed tanner, that would not trouble the country very long."

After Cadwallader's arrival and in consequence of his tact and diplomatic handling of a difficult situation arising from the constant cold war between the military and the press, he became definitely *persona grata* with Grant and his staff. Events soon proved the falsity of the rumors about Grant except that concerning his excessive drinking. Cadwallader tells some hair-raising stories of Grant's inability to say No when liquor was passed around. He quickly undertook the mission of keeping Grant sober and he was reasonably successful. At all events Grant soon accepted him as a close friend and associate, giving him unique opportunities to watch Grant, his staff and his troops in action.

Cadwallader's estimate of Grant was not long in the making. He quotes a letter to his wife, just before the siege of Vicksburg began: "Nothing like this campaign has occurred during this war. It stamps Gen. Grant as a man of uncommon military ability—proves him the foremost one in the west, if not in the nation."

Death by Design

ANDERSONVILLE
By MacKinlay Kantor
The World Publishing Company, 1955
767 Pages; \$5.00

Reviewed by
COL. S. LEGREE

For almost a hundred years the horror that was Andersonville has been known to students of the Civil War, and indeed to many who have read only casually in fiction. At a time when we are reminded daily of the conditions under which the Chinese have held, and possibly still hold, some of our men who fought in Korea, it is a bit difficult to realize that there are still one or two men living who fought in the war that brought forth Andersonville. Over all, things haven't changed much.

MacKinlay Kantor is a polished writer, a tireless researcher, and an author who knows the public taste. Combining these talents with a story as rich in tragedy as the Confederate prison in Georgia where more than 10,000 Federal POWs died from exposure, starvation, neglect and murder, we have a product that is too depressing to be considered a recreational reading experience, as we have learned to expect from fiction. And yet, despite

the book's 760 pages of horrible detail, it is difficult to put it aside. It has the fascination of viewing a bloody four-car smash-up or a tenement fire with victims leaping from windows.

Kantor does not blame the South or the Confederacy for Andersonville. He doesn't even blame history's scapegoat, Captain Henry Wirz. General John Winder, senile, vindictive, is the villain of the piece, aided by his cousin Dick Winder, the Quartermaster, and his son Sid, the Adjutant. Andersonville was designed by the Winders to kill off the Federals. No shade, no shelter, no sanitary provisions, springs filled in to cut off drinking water, swamps inclosed in the stockade—the entire pen could not have been more carefully calculated to murder the luckless prisoners by lingering torture. The food situation in the South was critical, but a year-in-year-out diet of baked corn meal, including ground-up cobs and other foreign matter, was not designed to help prisoners live. When the local population tried to deliver some vegetables to the stockade, Winder accused the people of disloyalty and did not permit the food to be given to the prisoners. Kantor pictures Wirz as a particularly Teutonic Swiss, suffering from the effects of poor surgery on a wrist wound, who wanted order and discipline and had no idea of how to get it; who commanded the stockade but not the troops who guarded it; and who was far over his depth in the job to which he was assigned. Emotionally warped, physically handicapped, and second-guessed by General Winder and the general's cousin and son, Wirz was misassigned, and controlled too tightly by those who wanted the Federals to die.

Reports were made by inspectors and surgeons, men of honor who placed their careers on the block in vain attempts to indicate to powers higher than Winder that the prison was unworthy of the South. Nothing happened. Bureaucratic inertia and Winder blocked every attempt by men of good will to aid the prisoners. The uselessness of the suffering at Andersonville is the underlying theme of the book; it would have taken so little in means, so little in humanity, to have saved thousands of lives.

The length of the book is worthy of comment. Not even Kantor could or would write 400,000 words about Andersonville and its environs. Much of the wordage is devoted to the backgrounds, in many cases the life stories, of different Federal prisoners who are singled out for specific mention. The detail in these chapters becomes almost boring—it has the virtue only of giving the reader respite from the dull depression of reading of men treated worse than predatory animals. This is definitely a book for those readers who know the technique of scanning and skipping. But, too, it is

a book for all Kantor fans, all Civil War enthusiasts, all who still believe war is glamorous, and all who enjoy the experience of reading the works of a man who instinctively chooses the right word and the right phrase to convey a crystal-clear meaning.

THE CIVIL WAR IN PICTURES

Arranged with Commentary by Fletcher Pratt
Henry Holt & Company, 1955
256 Pages; \$10.00

Reviewed by
COL. AARON A. GUNNER

Those who equate Civil War pictures with the Brady photographs will be disappointed; unfortunately the modern process of photo-engraving was not yet perfected at the time of that war and only woodcuts and line engravings could be reproduced on the printed page. The Northern publications sent artists rather than photographers to the war fronts; it is their illustrations that are reproduced here.

Most of the illustrations come from the files of *Harper's Weekly* and *Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper*. Pratt's commentary, which occupies about half the book's page space, is valuable but confusing. It is difficult at times to tie the fragmentary commentary to any particular illustration, and impossible to obtain anything resembling a running commentary on the war. There are an irritating number of illustrations that neither tie to the commentary nor seem to have any connection with the war at all.

On the credit side, the book does bring to the light of day, for the delight of those who enjoy anything connected with the Civil War, hundreds of exciting illustrations they might never have seen otherwise.

CAPTAIN DREYFUS: The Story of a Mass Hysteria
By Nicholas Halasz
Simon & Schuster, 1955
274 Pages; Index; \$3.50

Reviewed by
LT. COL. JOHN B. B. TRUSSELL, JR.

It is fitting that this book carries the subtitle, "The Story of a Mass Hysteria." It is, in fact, far more than a narrative of the tragedy of Captain Dreyfus. Rather, it is an account of one of the most serious crises through which France's Third Republic passed during the seventy stormy years of its existence.

This book performs a valuable service in throwing a clear light on the mass of complexities which the Dreyfus Affair became in the years during which it brought France to the brink of revolution. More than that, it provides an interesting case study of what can happen to a nation's conscience when chauvinism and authoritarianism are allowed to outweigh human liberties and individual rights.

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